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COLORADO AMENDMENT TWO
Neither the state of Colorado through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities, or school districts shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or other wise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, or claim of
discrimination. This section of the Constitution shall be self-executing.
94-1039 ROMER v. EVANS
Equal protection-State ban on local ordinances
conferring protected status on gays.
Ruling below (Colo SupCt, 882 P.2d 1335, 63
LW 2219):
Colorado constitutional amendment that pro-
hibits state or local governments from conferring
protected status on persons of "homosexual, lesbi-
an or bisexual orientation" infringes fundamental
right to participate equally in political process,
and is not narrowly tailored to serve state's assert-
ed compelling interests in preserving religious,
familial, and personal privacy, and in preserving
fiscal resources for enforcement of other civil
rights laws, and therefore violates Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
Question presented: Does popularly enacted
state constitutional amendment precluding spe-
cial state or local legal protections for homosex-
uals and bisexuals violate fundamental right of
independently identifiable, yet non-suspect,
classes to seek such special protections?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/12/94, by Gale
A. Norton, Colo. Atty. Gen., Stephen K. Erken-
Brack, Ch. Dpty. Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tym-
kovich, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey and Paul
Farley, Dpty. Attys. Gen., and Rex E. Lee and
Carter G. Phillips, Spec. Asst. Attys. Gen.
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Richard G. EVANS, Angela Romero, Linda Fowler, Paul Brown, Martina Navratilova,
Bret Tanberg, Priscilla Inkpen, the City and County of Denver, the City of
Boulder, the City of Aspen, and the City Council of Aspen, Plaintiffs,
V.
Roy ROMER as Governor of the State of Colorado and Gail Norton as Attorney
General of the State of Colorado, Defendants.
No. 92 CV 7223.
Colorado District Court, Denver County.
1993 WL 19678 (Colo.Dist.Ct.))
Jan. 15, 1993.
... BAYLESS, District Judge
The first matter of substance then that is
addressed after defining the boundaries is the Bill of
Rights in our Constitution. Now, I take that to mean
that in Colorado, rights come first. Section I of
Article II of the Bill of Rights sets out that all political
power in Colorado is vested in and derived from
people. Section 2 says the people of this state have the
sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as
free-as a free, sovereign, and independent state. And
to alter and abolish their Constitution and form of
government whenever they may deem it necessary to
their safety and happiness, provided such change be
not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
What that says is the majority of citizens can alter
the Constitution, it can change. And we have had 29
parts to that Constitution. There are 29 existing
articles to Amendment 2 that are the Bill of Rights in
Colorado. But in amending that and altering the form
of government, even a majority vote of the Colorado
citizens cannot violate the constitutional rights of
other Colorado citizens.
Now, the issue in question here in this hearing
relates to Article II Section 2 of the Colorado
Constitution. And it relates to the amendment of that
Constitution, the alteration of the State's Constitution
by the addition of what was called Amendment 2.
Amendment 2 is scheduled actually to become Section
30 of the Bill of Rights here in Colorado. The
question raised by the lawsuit asked the courts of
Colorado whether this amendment violates Article II
Section 2 of the Bill of Rights by virtue of being
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States...
Now, the first part of this case is the part we have
done this week. ... This first part deals with only
asking the Court to delay the effective date of the
Amendment until such time as that final
determination can be made. Such a request is proper,
and as a matter of fact, is provided for under the Rules
of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 65 here in
Colorado which allows for preliminary injunctions.
The plaintiffs are individuals and three home rule
cities who have asked the Court to delay the effective
date. . . . They must show the threshold of urgent
necessity, and then they must show to the satisfaction
of the Court these other six things....
In large measure, the proof which has been
offered has been focused on their position that
Amendment 2 is repugnant to the United States
Constitution. They argue that there's a urgent
necessity because of the probability of persons having
their fundamental constitutional rights violated for any
time period creates an urgent necessity. They argue
that the violation of these fundamental constitutional
rights causes irreparable harm, and so on, through the
six that I have to weigh.
The first one, and perhaps the one that most of the
attention has been based on is whether-has been
focused on, rather, is whether there's a reasonable
probability of success on the merits. Plaintiffs are
attacking the part of the Constitution of the State of
Colorado which was passed by a majority vote of the
voters November 3, 1992. Because it is a part of the
Constitution, they must prove at the final hearing in
order to prevail that this Amendment is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Plaintiffs argue that this Amendment deprives
them of fundamental rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. They do not argue that there is a
fundamental right to be homosexual or bisexual or
lesbian, which is found in the U.S. Constitution.
Rather, they argue that the rights they are deprived of
are found in the right to equal protection of the laws
under the First and 14th Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Specifically, plaintiffs argue that they will be
denied the right to vote and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances by the right to
have access to the courts. What does the Amendment
say? We have had the Amendment on the podium
from time to time here. It says, "Neither the state of
Colorado through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities, or school districts shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,
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conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class
of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status, or claim of
discrimination. This section of the Constitution shall
be self-executing."
Plaintiffs produced evidence that the Amendment
was only addressed to claims of discrimination by
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals. They did this
by the testimony of witnesses who came before this
Court and announced, self-declared, if you will, that
they were homosexual. And then by saying that
neither they or anyone that they knew who were also
homosexual are seeking to establish any minority
status or quota preference or protected status.
By doing this, the plaintiffs have attempted to
narrow the focus to the claim of discrimination based
on homosexual, bisexual, or lesbian orientation. They
therefore urge that the Amendment actually and only
stands for the proposition in Colorado by
Constitutional Amendment is now about to say that
there will be no remedy available for acts of
discrimination against homosexuals, bisexuals, and
lesbians because those people alone may not go to the
government to ask for laws to be enacted or existing
laws to be enforced which would prevent that
discrimination.
* * #
In short, the plaintiffs urge that this Amendment,
by denying the opportunity to obtain a remedy for
discrimination based upon these orientations, has
identified a specific group and said that any
discrimination as to that group because of membership
in that group may not be given relief or remedy by the
agencies of the state of Colorado.
It has not said that the state will discriminate
against homosexuals, bisexuals, or lesbians, but it has
said if any private citizen does discriminate based on
such orientation, that no remedy may be provided by
the State. Plaintiffs argue this Amendment endorses
and gives State-approval as to private discrimination.
Plaintiffs argue that such a State statement
endorsing and approving private discrimination
deprives them of the right to vote and the right to
approach their government; specifically, their courts,
for a redress of grievances.
Let's turn now to the defendants. ... Defendants
well and fairly argue there are several things here
that have been discussed that have been presented that
they strongly urge are not part of the case. Mr. Dailey
did this very well, really, at the upfront part of his
argument yesterday. He said Coloradans for Family
Values isn't a party here. He said the Religious Right
isn't a party here, nor the Political Right, nor whether
Colorado could be deemed a hate state. That's not
here, Judge. That's not what you are to decide. And
the defendants are correct, and the Court accepts that.
As a matter of fact, I looked at what was
presented to the Court in terms of the efforts that have
been made on the part of Coloradans for Family
Values and the Religious Right and the Political
Right. And what I saw was a group of Colorado
citizens who wanted to present an initiative to the
voters. They said we would like the voters of
Colorado to look at this. So they acquired signatures.
They presented things to the state government. They
followed the political process, and they got it on the
balloL And they lobbied for or were part of a lobbying
effort for the passage of the Amendment, and that
involved spending money and presenting their views.
The focus of the defendant's argument was that
this is not unconstitutional because all the
Amendment attempts to do is to make a part of
Colorado law that which is existing in the federal law
in terms of the treatment of homosexuals, lesbians,
bisexuals. The argument goes on that the courts
should not look to the limitation placed by plaintiffs
just on the discrimination but rather look to the whole
Amendment. And they urge that because that
demonstrates the true intent of the Amendment. If
you isolate on one part, you may not be viewing the
true intent and that the Courts should look to the
ballot analysis as a type of legislative history, if you
will, to demonstrate what that intent was.
The defendants also argue, and they cite the same
way, U.S. Supreme Court cases and cases from other
courts. They start with Bowers versus Hardwick, and
they urge that gay, lesbian, and bisexual conduct has
been held--"conduct," now, has been held to be
criminal by some states. That case involved a statute
outlawing sodomy. And that statute was sustained in
Bowers versus Hardwick by the United States Supreme
Court. And they urge that this behavior which can be
criminalized defines the class of people here.
They also argue that a law-making procedure that
disadvantages a particular group does not always
violate constitutional rights or deny equal protection,
and they cite Supreme Court case law for that. The
Court agrees with that general statement of the law.
They say there is no necessity for the Court to intrude
on the private and moral values of citizens, and that is
what is the heart of Amendment 2.
These are the positions which have been taken in
summary form by the two sides here. The question is
what is the Court to do. First, the Court is ruling on
a motion for preliminary injunction only. I am not
ruling on the constitutionality of Amendment 2. As a
matter of fact, the Court may not at this time rule on
the constitutionality of Amendment 2. I may only rule
on what is before me, the motion for preliminary
injunction.
. . . The Court's view is this: In large measure,
everything revolves around the first of the six claims.
That is--first of the six elements, excuse me, as to
whether plaintiffs have shown evidence and made
argument that leads this Court to conclude that they
have a reasonable probability of proving that
Amendment 2 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt at a hearing on the merits.
Keep in mind where I started. Rights come first
in the Colorado Constitution. Bill of Rights is first.
The question relates to whether Amendment 2
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amounts to a denial of a constitutional fundamental
right.
One, is that a violation which involves
something--violation of a fundamental right which
involves something called a suspect class or a
violation which involves a suspect class, even if it's
not a fundamental right, calls for strict scrutiny by the
Court. It's not here. Plaintiffs haven't argued it. It's
not for the Court to determine. Go on to the next.
A second involves what are described as equal
protection violations of fundamental rights. What are
fundamental rights? There have been a lot of cases
that have discussed those. Fundamental rights have
been deemed to include the right to participation in
elections. The right of access to the courts. Right of
privacy. And even the right of interstate travel. In
terms of this issue, the laws which may burden
fundamental rights of an independently identifiable
group are subject to what is called strict scrutiny of the
courts under this equal protection analysis.
That's where the plaintiffs urge the Court ought to
come down. Those two prongs. This is a fundamental
freedom. This is an independently identifiable group.
And therefore, the Court must view this under the
strict scrutiny standard. What does that mean? That
means a law which burdens any of these fundamental
rights of this independently identifiable group will
require the state now to show and have a burden that
this measure is necessarily related to a compelling
governmental interest.
So it changes. They have had all the burden here,
but if it were a strict scrutiny standard at the time of
hearing on the merits, there would be two standards.
One on this side of the room and one on that side of
the room. And plaintiffs urge that is the standard I
should apply.
The third standard which has been urged in part
at least by the defense is called the rational basis test.
And that involves laws which may involve not
fundamental rights but may be something that's
deemed non-fundamental rights in the Constitution,
and they are subject only to the test of rational basis.
That is to say, the Court is to defer to the legislation if
there is any rational relationship between a legitimate
public goal to be accomplished and the lines drawn
which may accomplish that, even though those lines
in the legislation may amount to some degree of
discrimination.
The Court concludes with regard to the first that
there is a fundamental freedom involved with
Amendment 2. The parties themselves have struggled
to identify the fundamental freedom. The reason they
have struggled, I think, is because they have tried to
cast it in the words of prior cases. Let me read you
some of those words. I'm going to read you some
quotes, and that's always a question as to whether
anybody ought to do this, but you have to understand
where the Court is coming from because of the law
that has come before.
So the first part has been established, the Court
concludes. There is a fundamental right here, and it's
the right not to have the State endorse and give effect
to private biases.
Second question, is there an identifiable class?
Yes. Lot of these cases say it's real hard to find an
identifiable class. Not here. The statute itself, the
Amendment 2 defines the identifiable class. A lot of
these cases say even though it is facially neutral; that
is to say, you can sell your property to anybody you
want or not sell it to anybody you don't want, this isn't
facially neutral. This identifies the class right in the
Amendment.
So I find that there is an identifiable class. Now,
with regard to the idea that's been argued by
defendants that you can't make this an identifiable
class because of Bowers versus Hardwick, the Court
concludes that this is principally, although, the term
"conduct" appears in there, this is principally an
Amendment which addresses status, not conduct.
Conduct is what Bowers versus Hardwick said.
The Court finds that this is a status. Therefore,
the Court finds that the burden at the hearing on the
merits is going to be twofold. One, the plaintiffs must
prove the unconstitutionality of this beyond a
reasonable doubt. But two, the Court will look at this
under the strict scrutiny standard. And therefore, the
State will have to show more than a mere rational
basis. They will have to show a substantial and
compelling government interest in passing this.
There will be a trial on the merits. The
amendment will be reviewed as though it is one
involving a fundamental right as affecting an
identifiable class. That requires strict scrutiny and the
two burdens. This will take place in light of what
Justice Warren said, "The evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Will the plaintiffs win? The Court does not
know. Do the plaintiffs have a reasonable probability,
given all of this, given all of the law that the Court has
examined, do they have a reasonable probability of
proving that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt? Yes.
The burdens of Rathke have been carried and met
by the plaintiffs. The motions for preliminary
injunction are granted, and the defendants--the
defendants, the Governor of the State of Colorado and
the Attorney General of the State of Colorado are
enjoined from declaring Amendment 2 in force, and
are enjoined from enforcing Amendment 2 until
further order of Court.
This Court is in recess.
(The proceedings were concluded.)
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Chief Justice ROVIRA delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Defendants, Roy Romer, Governor of the State of
Colorado, Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of the
State of Colorado, and the State of Colorado (referred
to collectively as "defendants") appeal the trial court's
entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining them from
enforcing a voter-initiated amendment to the Colorado
Constitution ("Amendment 2"). We affirm.
I
In May 1992, the requisite number of qualified
voters submitted petitions to the secretary of state to
present to the electorate a new section 30 to article II
of the Colorado Constitution. The proposed
constitutional amendment was put to the voters as
Amendment 2 on November 3, 1992, and passed by a
margin of 813,966 to 710,151 (53.4% to 46.6%).
* * #
Amendment 2 provides: No Protected Status
Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through
any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
to have or claim any minority status quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.
On November 12, 1992, Richard G. Evans, along
with eight other persons ("individual plaintiffs"), and
the Boulder Valley School District RE-2, the City and
County of Denver, the City of Boulder, the City of
Aspen, and the City Council of Aspen ("governmental
plaintiffs") (referred to collectively as "plaintiffs")
filed suit in Denver District Court to enjoin the
enforcement of Amendment 2 claiming that the
amendment is unconstitutional. This contention was
premised on several state and federal constitutional
provisions.
After plaintiffs' request for an expedited hearing
on the merits was rejected, they filed a motion seeking
to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of
Amendment 2 which was to go into effect on or before
January 15, 1993. In support of this motion,
plaintiffs argued that Amendment 2 deprives them of
the First Amendment right of free expression and their
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of
the laws. The First Amendment claim was based on
the contention that Amendment 2 eliminates all
potential means of redress for private retaliation or
discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals. Accordingly, the First Amendment requires
the government to demonstrate a compelling
justification for exposing those who engage in
expressive conduct to increased risk. This burden,
plaintiffs maintained, could not be met by the state.
The trial court neither addressed nor relied on this
argument in rendering its decision.
Plaintiffs presented two separate arguments under
the Equal Protection Clause. First, that Amendment
2 violates their right to equal protection of the laws
insofar as it denies gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
the opportunity to participate equally in the political
process. Second, that Amendment 2 lacks a rational
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basis for the burdens it imposes on gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
to consider the motion. Following its conclusion, the
court issued a temporary restraining order. The next
day, the trial court held that plaintiffs had met their
burden under the six-part test of Rathke v.
MacFarlane, which sets forth the applicable standard
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and
accordingly, granted plaintiffs' motion barring -the
enforcement of Amendment 2 pending the outcome of
a trial on the merits.
More specifically (and of central importance to
this appeal) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs
had met the threshold requirement of Rathke by
demonstrating that enjoining the enforcement of
Amendment 2 was necessary to protect their right to
equal protection of the laws under the United States
Constitution. The court reached this conclusion by
reasoning that Amendment 2 "may burden
fundamental rights of an identifiable group." The
fundamental right, the court went on, was "the right
not to have the State endorse and give effect to private
biases."
The trial court then determined that because
Amendment 2 may burden a fundamental
constitutional right, its constitutionality must be
assessed by reference to the "strict scrutiny" standard
of review. The court concluded that under this
standard, plaintiffs had shown to a reasonable
probability that Amendment 2 would be demonstrated
to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt at a
trial on the merits.
. . .The basis of defendants' challenge to the
preliminary injunction pertains only to the trial court's
determination that the threshold requirement of
Rathke v. MacFarlane had been met (i.e., that
injunctive relief is necessary to protect existing
fundamental constitutional rights). Accordingly, the
gravamen of defendants' allegation of error is their
contention that the trial court "did not base its decision
on any direct nrecedent," but rather "extrapolited from
several federal court decisions" the right identified and
allegedly infringed by Amendment 2. Moreover,
defendants argue, there is no applicable legal
precedent or established right under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
which Amendment 2 can be shown to infringe upon.
Defendants conclude, therefore, that "the lower court's
order was fundamentally flawed, and cannot be
sustained."
Plaintiffs have presented to this court the same
equal protection arguments that were made to, but not
relied on by, the trial court. They do not urge that we
base our decision on the precise right identified and
relied on by the trial court in rendering its decision.
To the contrary, they have argued to this court that the
right identified by the trial court, when "read in light
of the arguments actually presented to [it] . . . is best
construed to mean that Amendment 2 violates the
plaintiffs' fundamental right of political participation.
... " In short, plaintiffs urge us to rely only on the
equal protection arguments which they have relied on,
and that the trial court's ruling should be construed to
have done the same.
Before turning to the merits, we first set forth the
applicable standard of review which governs our
decision.
III
It is important to stress at the outset that the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution applies to all citizens, and not simply
those who are members of traditionally "suspect"
classes such as racial or ethnic minorities. That gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals have not been found to
constitute a suspect class, and that plaintiffs do not
claim that they constitute such a class do not render
the Equal Protection Clause inapplicable to them.
* $5*
Strict scrutiny review-the most exacting standard
of review under the Equal Protection Clause--is
reserved for statutes or state constitutional
amendments that discriminate against members of
traditionally suspect classes or infringe on any
fundamental constitutional. Laws that are subject to
strict scrutiny review will be sustained only if they are
supported by a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest in the least restrictive
manner possible.
Intermediate review, which requires a showing
that the law in question is substantially related to a
sufficiently important governmental interest has been
applied in the context of laws which draw distinctions
based on gender and, but not to those laws which
create differential treatment based on age.
Thus, in reviewing the trial court's determination
that the plaintiffs carried their burden of establishing
the threshold requirement. . ., we first must determine
which standard applies and second. whether
Amendment 2 can be shown, under that standard, and
to a reasonable degree of probability, to violate the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process and thus, any attempt to infringe on
that right must be subject to strict scrutiny and can be
held constitutionally valid only if supported by a
compelling state interest. This principle is what
unifies the cases, in spite of the different factual and
legal circumstances presented in each of them. Thus,
while all three categories of cases are distinguishable
from the present controversy, the common thread
which unites them with one another, and with the case
before us, is the principle that laws may not create
unequal burdens on identifiable groups with respect to
40
the right to participate in the political process absent
a compelling state interest.
This principle has received its most explicit, and
nuanced, articulation in yet another category of cases
where the legislation at issue bore a much closer
resemblance to the question presented by Amendment
2. This category of cases involves legislation which
prevented the normal political institutions and
processes from enacting particular legislation desired
by an identifiable group of voters.- In each case, the
legislation was held to be violative of equal protection.
* *$*
B
We conclude that the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution protects the
fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process, and that any legislation or state
constitutional amendment which infringes on this
right by "fencing out" an independently identifiable
class of persons must be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
We reject defendants' contention that Amendment
2 cannot be understood to infringe on any recognized
right protected under the Equal Protection Clause. We
do so for a number of reasons. First, defendants urge
that the authority relied on in reaching our conclusion,
when "properly analyzed," recognizes a cognizable
equal protection claim "only when the political process
has been restructured to place unusual burdens upon
racial groups, or, in the most expansive sense, [upon
politically powerless groups]." This contention belies
the fact that much of the authority relied on in
reaching our conclusion did not involve racial groups.
Finally, if the cases referred to above were
decided solely on the basis of the "suspect" nature of
the classes involved, there would have been no need
for the Court to consistently express the paramount
importance of political participation or to subject
legislation which infringed on the right to participate
equally in the political process to strict judicial
scrutiny. To the contrary, were these simply "race
cases," the Supreme Court would have been required
to do nothing more than note that the legislation at
issue drew a classification that was inherently suspect
(i.e., that discriminated on the basis of race), and
apply strict scrutiny to resolve those cases-irrespective
of the right, entitlement, or opportunity that was being
restricted.
We therefore conclude that defendants' argument
that the right to participate equally in the political
process applies only to traditionally suspect classes is
without merit. Similarly, we reject their argument
that the above cited authorities are properly
understood only as "suspect class" cases, and not
"fundamental rights" cases. We turn, therefore, to the
question of whether Amendment 2 has been shown, to
a reasonable degree of probability, to infringe on the
fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV
In reviewing Amendment 2, we do so in light of
its immediate objective, its ultimate effect, its
historical context, and the conditions existing prior to
its enactment.
The immediate objective of Amendment 2 is, at a
minimum, to repeal existing statutes, regulations,
ordinances, and policies of state and local entities that
barred discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The "ultimate effect" of Amendment 2 is to
prohibit any governmental entity from adopting
similar, or more protective statutes, regulations,
ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state
constitution is first amended to permit such measures.
In the absence of such a constitutional amendment,
any governmental entity would be acting contrary to
the state constitution by "adopting, enacting, or
enforcing" any such measure.
Thus, the right to participate equally in the
political process is clearly affected by Amendment 2,
because it bars gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from
having an effective voice in governmental affairs
insofar as those persons deem it beneficial to seek
legislation that would protect them from
discrimination based on their sexual orientation.
Amendment 2 alters the political process so that a
targeted class is prohibited from obtaining legislative,
executive, and judicial protection or redress from
discrimination absent the consent of a majority of the
electorate through the adoption of a constitutional
amendment. Rather than attempting to withdraw
antidiscrimination issues as a whole from state and
local control, Amendment 2 singles out one form of
discrimination and removes its redress from
consideration by the normal political processes.
Amendment 2 expressly fences out an
independently identifiable group. Like the laws that
were invalidated in Hunter, which singled out the
class of persons "who would benefit from laws barring
racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations,"
Amendment 2 singles out that class of persons
(namely gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals) who would
benefit from laws barring discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. No other identifiable group
faces such a burden--no other group's ability to
participate in the political process is restricted and
encumbered in a like manner. Such a structuring of
the political process undoubtedly is contrary to the
notion that "[tihe concept of 'we the people' under the
Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but
equality among those who meet the basic
qualifications."
In short, gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals are left
out of the political process through the denial of
having an "effective voice in the governmental affairs
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which substantially affect their lives." Strict scrutiny
is thus required because the normal political processes
no longer operate to protect these persons. Rather,
they, and they alone, must amend the state
constitution in order to seek legislation which is
beneficial to them. By constitutionalizing the
prescription that no branch or department, nor any
agency or political subdivision of the state "shall
enact, adopt, or enforce any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation .. . shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of . . . [a] claim of discrimination,"
Amendment 2 singles out and prohibits this class of
persons from seeking governmental action favorable
to it and thus, from participating equally in the
political process.
Prior to the passage of this amendment, gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals were, of course, free to appeal
to state and local government for protection against
discrimination based on their sexual orientation.
Thus, like any other members of the electorate, the
political process was open to them to seek legislation
or other enactments deemed beneficial in the same
way it was open to all others. Were Amendment 2 in
force, however, the sole political avenue by which this
class could seek such protection would be through the
constitutional amendment process. In short,
Amendment 2, to a reasonable probability, infringes
on a fundamental right protected by the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
Amendment 2 must be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny in order to determine whether it is
constitutionally valid under the Equal Protection
Clause.
Because the defendants and their amici have not
proffered any compelling state interest to justify the
enactment of Amendment 2 at this stage of the
proceedings as required under the strict scrutiny
standard of review.
V
That Amendment 2 was passed by a majority of
voters through the initiative process as an expression
of popular will mandates great deference. However,
the facts remain that "[o]ne's right to life, liberty, and
property.. . and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections," and that "[a] citizen's constitutional rights
can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of
the people choose that it be."
We reject defendants' argument that the trial court
erred in granting a preliminary injunction enjoining
defendants from enforcing Amendment 2 pending a




In my view, the district court's underlying legal
premise that the Supreme Court has recognized a
fundamental right not to have the State endorse and
give effect to private biases is erroneous. Similarly,
the majority's underlying legal premise that the
Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process is
erroneous. Because Supreme Court precedent does not
support the evaluation of Amendment 2 under the
strict scrutiny standard of review, I would reverse and
discharge the entry of the preliminary injunction, and
remand for trial on the permanent injunction.
42
Richard G. EVANS, Angela Romero, Linda Fowler, Paul Brown, Jane Doe, Marina
Navratilova, Bret Tanberg, Priscilla Inkpen, John Miller, the Boulder Valley
School District RE-2, the City and County of Denver, the City of Boulder, the
City of Aspen, and the City Council of Aspen, Plaintiffs,
v.
Roy ROMER as Governor of the State of Colorado, Gale Norton as Attorney General
of the State of Colorado, and the State of Colorado, Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 92 CV 7223.
Colorado District Court, City and County of Denver.
1993 WL 518586 (Colo.Dist.Ct.)
Dec. 14, 1993.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
H. JEFFREY BAYLESS, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1993, by a vote of 53.4% to
46.6%, the voters of the State of Colorado passed an
initiated amendment to the Colorado Constitution
referred to as Amendment 2. That amendment
provides: No Protected Status Based on Homosexual,
Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of
Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class
of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall
be in all respects self-executing.
Nine days after the amendment was passed,
plaintiffs, individuals, three home rule cities, and a
school district, filed the instant action seeking to have
Amendment 2 declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs
also sought and obtained a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the amendment from becoming effective
prior to court review. That injunction was upheld by
the Colorado Supreme Court July 19, 1993 in Evans
v. Romer).
In its ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court did
more than merely affirm the granting of the
preliminary injunction. By the terms of its ruling that
court set the guidelines this court must apply in
making its present decision. Certain parts of the
Supreme Court opinion must be noted for they form
the basis for the present ruling.
* *$*
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW REGARDING OFFERED COMPELLING
STATE INTERESTS
By virtue of the Supreme Court ruling, the burden
at trial was upon defendants to show at least one
compelling state interest and to show that Amendment
2 was narrowly drawn to support that interest. This is
an unusual placement of the burden of proof.
Defendants presented six alleged "compelling state
interests": 1) deterring factionalism; 2) preserving
the integrity of the state's political functions; 3)
preserving the ability of the State to remedy
discrimination against suspect classes; 4) preventing
the government from interfering with personal,
familial and religious privacy; 5) preventing
government from subsidizing the political objectives
of a special interest group; and 6) promoting the
physical and psychological well-being of our children.
The court will address each claimed compelling
interest separately.
The first claimed compelling state interest is that
Amendment 2 deters factionalism. In their trial brief
Defendants describe what they mean by factionalism
as follows: Amendment 2 does not purport to serve
any interests outside of Colorado's borders; rather, it
simply seeks to ensure that the deeply divisive issue of
homosexuality does not serve to fragment Colorado's
body politic. Amendment 2 eliminates city-by-city
and county-by-county battles over the political issue of
homosexuality and bisexuality. As a matter of law,
therefore, Amendment 2 serves a compelling state
interest by ending political fragmentation and
promoting statewide uniformity on this issue.
As defined by defendants, "factionalism" means
"political fragmentation" over a controversial political
issue. Defendants therefore define a difference of




Defendants' own authorities encourage the
"competition of ideas" with "uninhibited, robust and
wide-open" political debate. Defendants seek to deter
those very things as being "factionalism". The history
and policy of this country has been to encourage that
which defendants seek to deter.
Defendants first claimed compelling state interest
is not a compelling state interest. The opposite of
defendants' first claimed compelling interest is most
probably compelling.
Defendants' second suggested compelling state
interest is the preservation of the State's political
functions. Witnesses were offered who testified about
the "homosexual agenda" and the homosexual push
for "protected status" and urged that this Amendment
protected Colorado's political functions from being
overrun by such groups.
The evidence presented does not satisfy this court
that there is militant gay aggression in this state which
endangers the state's political functions. Similarly the
evidence does not persuade the court that absent
Amendment 2, homosexuals and bisexuals are going
to be found to be a suspect or quasi- suspect class and
afforded protections based on those classifications.
Finally, Defendants' legal argument is not supported
by federal or state case law, nor is it supported by the
Colorado Constitution. Defendants' argument seems
little more than a begging of the ultimate question to
be answered. The second alleged compelling interest
is not a compelling state interest.
The third interest claimed to be compelling is the
preservation of the ability of the state to remedy
discrimination against groups which have been held to
be suspect classes. This claim is basically that there
are insufficient fiscal resources available to the state to
add another group to the rolls of those protected by
existing civil rights laws or ordinances. Although not
totally clear from defendants' presentation, this claim
may relate in some wav to Amendment I passed in the
same election.
* *$ *
The facts don't support defendants' position.
Defendants' evidence was principally in the form of
opinion and theory as to what would occur if a Denver
type ordinance were adopted as a state statute. There
is no such statute, nor is one proposed. Plaintiffs'
evidence was based on what has happened over the
course of eleven years in Wisconsin, and during the
time in which the Denver ordinance has included a
sexual orientation provision. Those actual experiences
show that the presence of a sexual orientation
provision has not increased costs or impaired the
enforcement of other civil rights statutes or
ordinances.
Additionally, the Court has a very real question as
to whether fiscal concerns may rise to the level of a
compelling interest. At least three U.S. Supreme
Court cases have suggested that fiscal concerns do not
reach such a level when weighed against fundamental
or even less than fundamental rights. .
The Colorado Supreme Court has found the right
invaded in this case to be fundamental, and this court
now finds defendants' offered evidence of lack of fiscal
ability unpersuasive in all respects.
Defendants' fourth alleged compelling interest is
the prevention of governmental interference with
personal, familial and religious privacy.
In the present case, the religious belief urged by
defendants is that homosexuals are condemned by
scripture and therefore discrimination based on that
religious teaching is protected within freedom of
religion. The competing interest in the present case is
the right to participate in the political process as
outlined by the Colorado Supreme Court. On balance,
this court concludes that the two rights, the religious
right to discriminate and the homosexuals' right to
participate in political process can coexist.
When the court finds that the defendants have
presented a compelling state interest, the court is then
charged with determining whether Amendment 2 is
"narrowly drawn to achieve that interest in the least
restrictive manner possible." In this case it is obvious
that the amendment is not narrowly drawn to protect
religious freedom. The narrowly focused way of
addressing the Boulder ordinance is to add to it a
religious exemption such as is found in the Denver
and Aspen ordinances, not to deny gays and bisexuals
their fundamental right of participation in the political
process. The court specifically finds that Amendment
2 is not narrowly drawn to accomplish the purpose of
protecting religious freedom.
Most importantly, however, how does
Amendment 2, which impacts on fundamental rights
of an identifiable group, narrowly promote the goal of
promoting family values? Seemingly, if one wished to
promote family values, action would be taken that is
pro-family rather than anti some other group. The
tie-in between the interest of protecting the family and
denying gays and bisexuals the right to political
participation was not made by defendants'
presentation.
Defendants failed to meet their burden as to the
second prong of their claimed fourth compelling
interest, showing that this Amendment is narrowly
drawn to achieve its purpose of protecting religious
freedom or family privacy.
The general issue of whether personal privacy is
a compelling state interest was not adequately
established. The court can only speculate as to what
defendants mean by personal privacy and how
Amendment 2 protects such a right. Defendants have
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not carried their burden as to this alleged "compelling
state interest."
Defendants' fifth compelling interest is the
prevention of government from subsidizing the
political objectives of a special interest group. Their
strongest argument on this claim was: For example, if
a landlord is forced to rent an apartment to a
homosexual couple, the landlord is being forced to
accept, at least implicitly, a particular ideology.
No authority is offered for this fairly remarkable
conclusion, and none has been found. Further, the
logic of the argument is unclear. This claimed
compelling interest was not supported by any credible
evidence or any cogent argument, and the court
concludes that it is not a compelling state interest.
The final interest urged is the promotion of the
physical and psychological well-being of children.
The defendants argue: The state has a compelling
interest in supporting the traditional family because
without it, our children are condemned to a higher
incidence of social maladies such as substance abuse,
poverty, violence, criminality, greater burdens upon
government, and perpetuation of the underclass.
* *$ *
The defendants have presented evidence of only
two compelling state interests that Amendment 2
serves, the promotion of religious freedom and the
promotion of family privacy. As to those two interests
the Amendment is not "narrowly drawn to achieve
that purpose in the least restrictive manner possible."
Defendants have failed to carry the burden assigned to
them by the Colorado Supreme Court and therefore
this Court concludes that Amendment 2 is
unconstitutional as being violative of the fundamental
right of an identifiable group to participate in the
political process without being supported by a
compelling state interest.
Plaintiffs' Claim of Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Class
The above ruling, however, is not the end of the
matter. In one of their trial briefs plaintiffs admit that
"if the defendants do not meet their burden of showing
that Amendment 2 serves a compelling interest by the
least restrictive means, then Amendment 2 must be
held unconstitutional. . . ." Notwithstanding the fact
that the court has now ruled as plaintiffs suggest, they
nonetheless seek to have the court rule on three
additional matters. First they claim that homosexuals
and bisexuals ought to be found to be a suspect class
and entitled to strict scrutiny review for that reason.
Second they claim that homosexuals and bisexuals
ought to be found to be a quasi-suspect class and be
entitled to heightened scrutiny review. Finally they
claim that Amendment 2, even if subject to the least
stringent standard of review, the rational basis review,
ought to be found unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs' presentation seeking suspect class status
may be new or a change of plaintiffs' initial position.
The Supreme Court was unaware that plaintiffs were
seeking suspect class status. That court noted, "That
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals have not been found
to constitute a suspect class, (citations omitted) and
that plaintiffs do not claim that they constitute such a
class do not render the Equal Protection Clause
inapplicable to them."
Plaintiffs urge that this Court should find that the
elements associated with a suspect class are present in
the homosexual and bisexual community. Plaintiffs
argue that those elements are: (1) common traits; (2)
a history of discrimination; (3) especially vulnerable
in society, and that; (4) the common trait is irrelevant
to individual merit. This set of elements is a re-
definition or amalgamation of elements from other
cases. No case cited contains these four elements. In
order to persuade the court, plaintiffs filled the witness
stand with doctors, psychiatrists, genetic explorers,
historians, philosophers, and political scientists.
Having chosen to present these types of witnesses,
defendants felt obliged to respond in kind.
* *$ *
In applying these standards to homosexuals and
bisexuals, no appellate court has yet found them to be
either a "suspect" or quasi-suspect" class. It also bears
noting that to date the Supreme Court has only
recognized three classifications as suspect and two as
quasi- suspect. However, the Supreme court has
recognized only three classifications as suspect: race,
alienage, and national origin; and two others as
quasi-suspect: gender, and illegitimacy.
* * *
One of the hot debates among witnesses addressed
the question of whether homosexuality is inborn, a
product of "nature", or a choice based on life
experiences, a product of "nurture". Plaintiffs strongly
argue that homosexuality is inborn. All the suspect
and quasi-suspect classes, race, alienage, national
origin, gender and illegitimacy, are inborn.
Defendants argue that homosexuality or bisexuality is
either a choice, or its origin has multiple aspects or its
origin is unknown. The preponderance of credible
evidence suggests that there is a biologic or genetic
"component" of sexual orientation, but even Dr.
Hamer, the witness who testified that he is 99.5% sure
there is some genetic influence in forming sexual
orientation, admits that sexual orientation is not
completely genetic. The ultimate decision on "nature"
vs "nurture" is a decision for another forum, not this
court, and the court makes no determination on this
issue.
The federal court in High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, supra, concluded
that there is a history of discrimination against gays.
That same court concluded that gays were not a
suspect class, however, because they failed to establish
two other required elements. This court concludes as
did the court in High Tech Gays that there is a history
of discrimination against homosexuals.
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The court cannot conclude, however, that
homosexuals and bisexuals remain vulnerable or
politically powerless and in need of "extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process" in
today's society. Failure to prevail on an issue in an
election, such as Amendment 2 is not a demonstration
of political powerlessness. Indeed, in the case of the
vote on Amendment 2, the evidence supports a finding
of the political power of gays and bisexuals.
According to the figures presented to the court, more
than 46% of Coloradans voting voted against
Amendment 2. Testimony placed the percentage of
homosexuals in our society at not more than 4%. If
4% of the population gathers the support of an
additional 42% of the population, that is a
demonstration of power, not powerlessness. The
President of the United States has taken an active and
leading role in support of gays, and an increasing
number of states and localities have adopted gay rights
protective statutes and ordinances such as the three
city ordinances in the present case. Because the gay
position has been defeated in certain elections, such as
Amendment 2, does not mean gays are particularly
politically vulnerable or powerless. It merely shows
that they lost that election. No adequate showing has
been made of the political vulnerability or
powerlessness of gays.
The evidence at trial was that there is no
identifiable majority in American politics. Numerical
majorities of whites, heterosexuals and women were
identified, but each numerical majority is so internally
divided that it does not form an effective political
majority. Therefore, the evidence showed political
majorities are formed through the process of coalition
building on an issue by issue, or election by election,
basis. Those coalitions come together or do not come
together to the level of a majority. What was
established to the satisfaction of this court is that gays
and bisexuals though small in number are skilled at
building coalitions which is a key to political power.
They are not therefore politically vulnerable or
powerless. Homosexuals fail to meet the element of
political powerlessness and therefore fail to meet the
elements to be found a suspect class.
Case law has not clearly differentiated between
the elements of a "suspect" class and a "quasi-suspect"
class. Plaintiffs similarly have not established to the
satisfaction of this court what those elements are, how
they are distinguished from a suspect class, and how
they apply to homosexuals and bisexuals. There are
two recognized "quasi-suspect" classes, gender and
illegitimacy. Neither of the existing quasi-suspect
classes encompass homosexuals and bisexuals. No
real effort was put forth to establish that homosexuals
and bisexuals fit the existing definitions. Plaintiffs
have failed to carry their burden to establish that
homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class.
JUDGMENT
Amendment 2 is found to be unconstitutional and
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Defendants, Roy Romer, Governor of the State of
Colorado, Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of the
State of Colorado, and the State of Colorado
(defendants) appeal the trial court's entry of a
permanent injunction enjoining them from enforcing
a voter-initiated amendment to the Colorado
Constitution ("Amendment 2"). We affirm.
I
In May 1992, petitions which would amend the
Colorado Constitution by adding a new section 30b to
article II were filed with the secretary of state. The
proposed amendment was put to the voters as
Amendment 2 on November 3, 1992, and passed by a
vote of 813,966 to 710,151 (53.4% to 46.6%). The
secretary of state certified the results on December 16,
1992, as required by article V, section 1, of the state
constitution.
Amendment 2 provides: No Protected Status
Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through
any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
to have or claim any minority status quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.
On November 12, 1992, Richard G. Evans, along
with eight other persons, the Boulder Valley School
District RE-2, the City and County of Denver, the City
of Boulder, the City of Aspen, and the City Council of
Aspen (plaintiffs) filed suit in Denver District Court to
enjoin the enforcement of Amendment 2 claiming that
the amendment was unconstitutional.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
to consider plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction. Subsequently, the court granted the
motion and prohibited the defendants from enforcing
Amendment 2 pending the outcome of a trial on the
merits.
The defendants appealed pursuant to C.A.R.
1(a)(3), and we granted review. See Evans v. Romer,
854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.1993) (Evans I). In Evans I, we
first addressed the question of the legal standard to be
applied in reviewing the trial court's entry of the
preliminary injunction. Following the precedent of
the United States Supreme Court, we held that "the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution protects the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process," and "that
any legislation or state constitutional amendment
which infringes on this right by 'fencing out' an
independently identifiable class of persons must be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 1282.
After recognizing that "[tjhe immediate objective
of Amendment 2 is, at a minimum, to repeal existing
statutes, regulations, ordinances, and policies of state
and local entities that barred discrimination based on
sexual orientation" and that the " 'ultimate effect' of
Amendment 2 is to prohibit any governmental entity
from adopting similar, or more protective statutes,
regulations, ordinances, or policies in the future unless
the state constitution is first amended to permit such
measures," we held: [T]he right to participate equally
in the political process is clearly affected by
Amendment 2, because it bars gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals from having an effective voice in
governmental affairs insofar as those persons deem it
beneficial to seek legislation that would protect them
from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.
Amendment 2 alters the political process so that a
targeted class is prohibited from obtaining legislative,
executive, and judicial protection or redress from
discrimination absent the consent of a majority of the
electorate through the adoption of a constitutional
amendment. Rather than attempting to withdraw
antidiscrimination issues as a whole from state and
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local control, Amendment 2 singles out one form of
discrimination and removes its redress from
consideration by the normal political processes. Id. at
1285. We concluded that the trial court did not err in
granting the preliminary injunction enjoining
defendants from enforcing Amendment 2.
After our decision in Evans I, the case was
remanded to the trial court to determine whether
Amendment 2 was supported by a compelling state
interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Id. at 1286. At trial the defendants offered six
"compelling" state interests: (1) deterring
factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's
political functions; (3) preserving the ability of the
state to remedy discrimination against suspect classes;
(4) preventing the government from interfering with
personal, familial, and religious privacy;
(5) preventing government from subsidizing the
political objectives of a special interest group; and
(6) promoting the physical and psychological
well-being of Colorado children.
The trial court concluded that the interest in
deterring "factionalism" was in truth, nothing more
than an attempt to impede the expression of "a
difference of opinion on a controversial political
question .. ." It concluded that the first governmental
interest was not a compelling state interest but rather,
that "the opposite of defendants' claimed compelling
interest is most probably compelling," i.e.,
encouraging the competition of ideas with uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open political debate.
The trial court found that the interest of
preserving the State's political functions, premised on
the Tenth Amendment right of the states to amend
state constitutions, was not a compelling interest since
"[djefendants' legal argument is not supported by
federal or state case law, nor is it supported by the
Colorado Constitution."
With respect to the interest in preserving the
ability of the state to remedy discrimination against
groups which have been held to be suspect classes, the
trial court tated its dnimht n to whthr fical
concerns of the state rise to the level of a compelling
state interest. The court held that Amendment 2 could
not be understood to further this interest because,
[diefendants' evidence was principally in the form of
opinion and theory as to what would occur if a Denver
type ordinance were adopted as a state statute. There
is no such statute, nor is one proposed. Plaintiffs'
evidence was based on what has happened over the
course of eleven years in Wisconsin, and during the
time in which the Denver ordinance has included a
sexual orientation provision. Those actual experiences
show that the presence of a sexual orientation
provision has not increased costs or impaired the
enforcement of other civil rights statutes or
ordinances. Thus, the trial court concluded that
"defendants' offered evidence of lack of fiscal ability
[is] unpersuasive in all respects."
The trial court held that preventing the
government from interfering with personal, familial,
and religious privacy was, in part, a compelling state
interest. Although the court acknowledged promotion
of family privacy is a compelling state interest, it held
that defendants never established what they meant by
the term "family." Moreover, defendants failed to
"tie-in . . . the interest of protecting the family and
denying gays and bisexuals the right to political
participation. . . ."
The trial court also found that preserving
religious liberty was a compelling state interest.
However, it held that Amendment 2 was not narrowly
tailored to serve this interest. "The narrowly focused
way of addressing [antidiscrimination protections for
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals] is to add to it a
religious exemption such as is found in the Denver
and Aspen ordinances, not to deny gays and bisexuals
their fundamental right of participation in the political
process."
The trial court rejected the personal privacy
component of the argument on the grounds that "[t]he
general issue of whether personal privacy is a
compelling state interest was not adequately
established. The court can only speculate as to what
defendants mean by personal privacy and how
Amendment 2 protects such a right."
The interest in preventing government from
subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest
group was rejected on the grounds that "[tihis claimed
compelling interest was not supported by any credible
evidence or any cogent argument, and the court
concludes that it is not a compelling state interest."
Similarly, the trial court rejected the argument
that the protection of children is a compelling state
interest served by Amendment 2 because "[diefendants
have failed to present sufficient evidence to support
this claimed compelling interest."
Accordingly, because the trial court concluded
that Amendment 2 was not necessary to support any
compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to meet
that interest, it permanently enjoined the enforcement
of Amendment 2.
On appeal the defendants argue that: (1) the legal
standard set forth by this Court in Evans I for
assessing the constitutionality of Amendment 2 should
be reconsidered; (2) Amendment 2 is supported by
several compelling state interests and is narrowly
tailored to meet those interests; (3) that the
unconstitutional provisions of Amendment 2 are
severable from the remainder; and (4) Amendment 2
is a valid exercise of state power under the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
II
Defendants first ask that we reconsider the
constitutional principles articulated in Evans I, but
they offer no arguments that were not then considered
and rejected by this court. We see no reason to revisit
that decision. We reaffirm our holding that the
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constitutionality of Amendment 2 must be determined
with reference to the strict scrutiny standard of review.
III
A legislative enactment which infringes on a
fundamental right or which burdens a suspect class is
constitutionally permissible only if it is "necessary to
promote a compelling state interest," and does so in
the least restrictive manner possible The question of
what constitutes a compelling state interest is one of
law and thus, we review the trial court's ruling de
novo. Defendants argue that Amendment 2 is
supported by a number of compelling state interests
and is narrowly tailored to serve those interests.
A
Defendants' first asserted governmental interest is
in protecting the sanctity of religious, familial, and
personal privacy. Freedom of religion is expressly
guaranteed by both the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article II, section 4 of the
Colorado Constitution and stands at the core of our
Nation's history and tradition. It is among the highest
values of our society. There can be little doubt that
ensuring religious freedom is a compelling
governmental interest.
Defendants argue that Amendment 2 is necessary
to serve this interest because "[u]nder the ordinances
preempted by Amendment 2, individual landlords or
employers who have deep-seated and profound
religious objections to homosexuality would
nonetheless be compelled to compromise those
convictions, under threat of government sanctions."
In support of this proposition, defendants rely on
Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous.,
25 Cal.App.4th 251, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 395 (3
Dist. 1994), pet. for review granted and opinion
superseded by Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 880 P.2d 111
(Cal.1994). (See Cal.Ct.Rules 976(d) opinion
withdrawn from publication pending review).
In Smith, the plaintiff challenged the ruling of the
California Commission of Fair Employment and
Housing which found that she had impermissibly
discriminated, based on their marital status, against a
couple who sought to rent housing. The couple was
unmarried and the plaintiff refused to rent to them on
the grounds that doing so would violate her
deeply-held religious beliefs. Plaintiff was ordered to
cease and desist marital discrimination; post a notice
announcing her violation of California law for ninety
days; permanently post a notice to rental applicants of
their rights and remedies under California
antidiscrimination laws; and sign both notices and
provide copies to each person who subsequently
expressed an interest in renting her property. Id. 30
Cal.Rptr.2d at 397-98.
The California court of appeals concluded that the
commission's order substantially burdened plaintiffs
free exercise rights because she "cannot remain
faithful to her religious convictions and beliefs and yet
rent to unmarried couples." Id. 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 399.
Assuming arguendo that ordinances such as that
in effect in Boulder, which prohibit discrimination
against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals in housing
and employment but which contain no exception for
religiously-based objections, substantially burden the
religious liberty of those who object to renting or
employing gay men, lesbians, or bisexuals on religious
-- grounds, the enactment of Amendment 2 clearly is not
narrowly tailored to serve the interest of ensuring
religious liberty. To the contrary, an equally effective,
and substantially less onerous way of accomplishing
that purpose simply would be to require that
antidiscrimination laws which include provisions for
sexual orientation also include exceptions for
religiously-based objections. This is precisely what
the Denver antidiscrimination laws provide. Denver,
Colo., Rev.Mun.Code art. IV, §§ 8-92, 28-93, 28-95
to 28-97 (1992 Supp.). Similar exemptions for
religious organizations are found in federal
antidiscrimination statutes. Defendants do not, and
we doubt that they could, argue that the Denver
ordinance impairs religious freedom. Indeed, Joseph
Broadus, who testified as an expert witness on behalf
of the defendants, testified that imposing a religiously-
based exemption on antidiscrimination laws intended
to protect gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals would be
less restrictive than Amendment 2 and would
adequately address any concerns about religious
liberty.
It is clear that Amendment 2, which affects the
fundamental right of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
to participate equally in the political process, is not the
least restrictive means of ensuring religious liberty,
and is not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
governmental interest in ensuring the free exercise of
religion.
Defendants also argue that Amendment 2 serves
the compelling interest of preserving "familial
privacy." Family privacy is characterized by
defendants as the right "of some parents to teach
traditional moral values" to their children. As
support, defendants cite authority recognizing the
sanctity of the family and the central role the family
plays in society.
Defendants contend that the "right of familial
privacy" is "severely undermiine[d]" by the enactment
of antidiscrimination laws protecting gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals because "[i]f a child hears one
thing from his parents and the exact opposite message
from the government, parental authority will
inevitably be undermined." This argument fails
because it rests on the assumption that the right of
familial privacy engenders an interest in having
government endorse certain values as moral or
immoral. While it is true that parents have a
constitutionally protected interest in inculcating their
children with their own values, defendants point to no
authority, and we are aware of none, holding that
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parents have the corresponding right of insuring that
government endorse those values.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the individual's right to profess or practice
certain moral or religious beliefs does not entail a
right to have government itself reinforce or follow
those beliefs or practices. Furthermore, it is clear that
the government does not burden an individual's
constitutional rights merely because it endorses views
with which that individual may disagree.
Consequently, fully recognizing that parents have
a "privacy" right to instruct their children that
homosexuality is immoral, we find that nothing in the
laws or policies which Amendment 2 is intended to
prohibit interferes with that right. With or without
Amendment 2, parents retain full authority to express
their views about homosexuality to their children. We
believe that Amendment 2 is neither necessary nor
narrowly tailored to preserve familial privacy because
that right is not implicated by the laws and policies
which Amendment 2 proscribes.
Defendants also argue that Amendment 2 serves
the compelling state interest in preserving "personal
privacy." While it is not entirely clear what is meant
by the phrase, it appears that the defendants are
referring to the right of "associational privacy" which
will be impaired in the absence of Amendment 2
because individuals may be forced to associate with
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals in the rental of
housing.
As the Supreme Court has explained, the right of
associational privacy protects associations involving,
deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily
few other individuals with whom one shares not only
a special community of thoughts, experiences, and
beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's
life.... [They are distinguished by such attributes as
relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in the
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship. As a general matter, only relationships
with these eric of nualities are likely to reflect the
considerations that have led to an understanding of
freedom of association as an intrinsic element of
personal liberty.
While preserving associational privacy may rise
to the level of a compelling state interest, Amendment
2 is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Amendment 2 would forbid governmental entities
from prohibiting discrimination against gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals (because they are gay, lesbian,
or bisexual) in all aspects of commercial and public
life, no matter how impersonal. Amendment 2 affects
a vast array of affiliations which in no way implicate
associational privacy. None of the criteria needed to
precipitate associational privacy rights exists: there is
no "special community" distinguished by "selectivity,"
"relative smallness," or any concern with "distinctively
personal aspects of one's life." Id. [Ain association
lacking these qualities--such as a large business
enterprise--seems remote from the concerns giving
rise to this constitutional protection. Accordingly, the
Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the
State's power to control the selection of one's spouse
that would not apply to regulations affecting the
choice of one's fellow employees.
To the extent that antidiscrimination laws
protecting gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals have the
potential to implicate associational privacy rights, a
-narrower way of avoiding this conflict would be to
exempt the sort of intimate associations identified in
Roberts from the scope of such laws. For instance,
landlords could be allowed to discriminate against
homosexuals in the rental of owner-occupied
housing--the so-called "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding
House" exception. Similar exemptions already exist
under Colorado law. For instance, Denver's
antidiscrimination ordinance exempts from its housing
and public accommodation provisions multiple unit
dwellings of not more than two units where one of the
units is owner occupied. Denver, Colo.,
Rev.Mun.Code art. IV, §§28-95(b)(2) & 28-96(b)(2)
(1991). Similarly, the Colorado Civil Rights statute
exempts from the definition of "housing" any room
offered for rent or lease in a single- family dwelling
occupied in part by the owner. §24-34-501(2), 10A
C.R.S. (1988).
Amendment 2, however, does no such thing.
Rather, it prohibits governmental entities from
enacting laws barring discrimination against gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals in all contexts, regardless of
the nature of the relationship involved and the extent
of intimacy inherent in those relationships.
Amendment 2 sweeps more broadly than necessary
and is not narrowly tailored to serve the governmental
interest in preserving associational privacy.
B
Defendants next assert that because "laws and
policies designed to benefit homosexuals and bisexuals
have an adverse effect on the ability of state and local
governments to combat discrimination against suspect
classes- . Amendment 2 is an appropriate means
whereby the people sought to focus government's
limited resources upon those circumstances most
warranting attention." In short, defendants take the
position that Amendment 2 serves the compelling
governmental interest in seeing that limited resources
are dedicated to the enforcement of civil rights laws
intended to protect suspect classes rather than having
a portion of those resources diverted to the
enforcement of laws intended to protect gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals.
It is well-settled that the preservation of fiscal
resources, administrative convenience, and the
reduction of the workload of governmental bodies are
not compelling state interests.
Consequently, we conclude that defendants'
asserted interest in preserving the fiscal resources of
state and local governments for the exclusive use of
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enforcing civil rights laws intended to protect suspect
classes does not constitute a compelling state interest.
Assuming that the state has some legitimate
interest in preserving fiscal resources for the
enforcement of civil rights laws intended to protect
suspect classes, and recognizing that combating
discrimination against racial minorities and women
may constitute a compelling governmental interest,
the evidence presented indicates that Amendment 2 is
not necessary-to achieve these goals. -The chief
enforcement officer for Denver's antidiscrimination
ordinance testified that Denver's protection of gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals has not prevented Denver
from protecting other groups or had any significant
fiscal impact on Denver. The chief of Wisconsin's
Civil Rights Bureau testified, based on twelve years
experience with Wisconsin's enforcement of its
antidiscrimination laws, that protection of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons has not limited
enforcement of other parts of the Wisconsin statutes.
The trial court found that protecting gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals from discrimination "has not
increased costs or impaired the enforcement of other
civil rights statutes or ordinances." This finding is
supported by the record and substantiates the
conclusion that Amendment 2 is not necessary to serve
the governmental interest asserted.
Even if protecting gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals from discrimination has some fiscal impact
on the state, Amendment 2 is not narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. Ensuring that certain racial,
gender, or ethnic groups receive undiminished funds
for civil rights enforcement could easily be
accomplished by ear-marking funds to cover the costs
of such enforcement. Under such an arrangement, any
protection for gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals would
have to be funded from sources other than funds
reserved for the protection of the specified suspect
classes. The governmental interest in insuring
adequate resources for the enforcement of civil rights
laws designed to protect suspect classes from
discrimination need not be accomplished by denying
the right of av men, leshianc nd hiexial frnm
participating equally in the political process. Rather,
this interest can be served in such way that no persons'
fundamental rights need be denied.
The defendants' second asserted governmental
interest in support of Amendment 2 is neither
necessary nor narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
C
Defendants next argue that Amendment 2
"promotes the compelling governmental interest of
allowing the people themselves to establish public
social and moral norms." In support of this
proposition, defendants define two related norms
which are promoted by Amendment 2: Amendment
2 preserves heterosexual families and heterosexual
marriage and, more generally, it sends the societal
message condeniing gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
as immoral.
The only authority relied on to support the view
that the protection of morality constitutes a compelling
governmental interest is Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504
(1991). Defendants cite the plurality opinion in Barnes
for the proposition that "the State's interest in
protecting order and morality is compelling;
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent;
strong." Barnes does not support defendants'
contention that protecting public morality constitutes
a compelling governmental interest.
In Barnes, four Justices held that "the public
indecency statute . . furthers a substantial
government interest in protecting order and morality."
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567, 111 S.Ct. at 2461 (emphasis
added). Justice Souter provided the fifth vote in
Barnes, however he did not rely "on the possible
sufficiency of society's moral views to justify the
limitations at issue." Id. at 582, 111 S.Ct. at 2468
(Souter, J., concurring). Rather, he was of the opinion
that the Indiana law at issue (which prohibited
completely nude dancing) was permissible due to the
"State's substantial interest in combating the
secondary effects of adult entertainment
establishments." Id. None of the justices in Barnes
concluded that furthering public morality constitutes
a compelling state interest.
Consequently, defendants have cited no authority
to support the proposition that the promotion of public
morality constitutes a compelling governmental
interest, and we are aware of none. At the most, this
interest is substantial. However, a substantial
governmental interest is not sufficient to render
constitutional a law which infringes on a fundamental
right--the interest must be compelling.
Furthermore, even recognizing the legitimacy of
promoting public morals as a governmental interest,
it is clear to us that Amendment 2 is not necessary to
preserve heterosexual families, marriage, or to express
disapproval of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. First,
we reject defendants' suggestion that laws prohibiting
discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals will undermine marriages and heterosexual
families because married heterosexuals will "choose"
to "become homosexual" if discrimination against
homosexuals is prohibited. This assertion flies in the
face of the empirical evidence presented at trial on
marriage and divorce rates. For example, Wisconsin,
the state with the oldest "gay rights" law in the nation,
enacted in 1982, reports that the divorce rate in
Wisconsin declined after the enactment of its
antidiscrimination statute.
Defendants also argue that the "endorsement" of
homosexuality undermines marriage and heterosexual
families because antidiscrimination laws implicitly
endorse that conduct which is deemed an improper
basis for discrimination. We are of the opinion,
however, that antidiscrimination laws make no
assumptions about the morality of protected
classes--they simply recognize that certain
characteristics, be they moral or immoral--have no
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relevance in enumerated commercial contexts. For
instance, it is difficult to imagine how a law which
prohibits employers from discriminating against
anyone engaged in off-duty, legal conduct such as
smoking tobacco, see §24-34-402.5, 1OA C.R.S. (1994
Supp.), constitutes an endorsement of smoking.
In short, prohibitions on discrimination against
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals do not imply an
endorsement of any particular sexual orientation or
practices. To the contrary, prohibitions on
discrimination imply at most that termination of
employment, eviction or denial of rental opportunities,
denial of insurance coverage, and other sanctions in
commercial contexts based on sexual orientation are
not appropriate ways of advancing even valid moral
beliefs.
Accordingly, we reject defendants' third asserted
interest as a basis for finding that Amendment 2 is
constitutionally valid.
D
Defendants contend that Amendment 2 "prevents
government from supporting the political objectives of
a special interest group." The only argument offered
to substantiate the contention that this is a compelling
state interest is the following observation from Lyng
v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 369, 108 S.Ct.
1184, 1191, 99 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988): "[Alt the heart of
the First Amendment is the notion that an individual
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free
society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and
his conscience rather than coerced by the State."
Defendants do not claim that the laws which
Amendment 2 is intended to prohibit constitute an
infringement on the First Amendment liberties
identified in Lyng. Similarly, they do not take the
position that those laws amount to a "coerc[ion] by the
State" to believe anything. Rather, they assert that the
laws which Amendment 2 is intended to prohibit
constitute an implicit endorsement of homosexuality
and that this somehow vitiates the right of individuals
"to make their own judgments on this question. . . ."
As explained above, however, we do not believe that
antidiscrimination laws constitute an endorsement of
the characteristics that are deemed an unlawful basis
upon which to discriminate against individuals.
More significantly, defendants offer no authority
to support the rather remarkable proposition that the
government has a compelling interest in seeing that
the state does not support the political objectives of a
"special interest group." The state exists for the very
purpose of implementing the political objectives of the
governed so long as that can be done consistently with
the constitution. The fact that some political
objectives are promoted by "special interest groups" is
utterly inconsequential. Indeed, virtually any law
could be regarded as a benefit to a "special interest
group." If defendants' argument had any merit at all,
the compelling state interest defined would justify
striking down almost any legislative enactment
imaginable. This is clearly not the law. No citation of
authority is needed to make the point.
We reject defendants' assertion that Amendment
2 is justified by the compelling governmental interest
in not having the state endorse the political objectives
of a special interest group.
E
Defendants claim that Amendment 2 "serves to
-deter factionalism through ensuring that decisions
regarding special protections for homosexuals and
bisexuals are made at the highest level of
government." More specifically, they argue that
"Amendment 2 is intended, not to restrain the
competition of ideas," but "seeks to ensure that the
deeply divisive issue of homosexuality's place in our
society does not serve to fragment Colorado's body
politic." Amendment 2 accomplishes this end by
eliminating "city-by-city and county-by-county battles
over this issue."
We reject the argument that the interest in
deterring factionalism, as defined by defendants, is
compelling. Political debate, even if characterized as
"factionalism," is not an evil which the state has a
legitimate interest in deterring but rather, constitutes
the foundation of democracy. "[Tlhere is no
significant state or public interest in curtailing debate
or discussion of a ballot measure." We fail to see how
the state, which is charged with serving the will of the
people, can have any legitimate interest in preventing
one side of a controversial debate from pressing its
case before governmental bodies simply because it
would prefer to avoid political controversy or
"factionalism."
In support of the asserted compelling interest in
deterring factionalism, defendants rely on Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714
(1974). Storer involved a state requirement that
proponents of any viewpoint resign from political
parties and not run in those parties' primaries if the
proponents intend to run as independent candidates.
The purpose of this neutral election procedure was to
insure that independent candidates were more than
merely sore losers who, having lost one primary, ran
as "independents" to satisfy "short-range political
goals, pique, or personal quarrel."
Neither Storer, nor any other case we are aware of
supports the proposition that there is a compelling
governmental interest in preventing divisive issues
from being debated at all levels of government by
prohibiting one side of the debate from seeking
desirable legislation in those fora. We conclude that
the interest in deterring "factionalism" is not a
compelling state interest.
F
Defendants argue that each of the governmental
interests, while individually adequate to validate
Amendment 2, "are especially so when considered in
the aggregate." None of the interests identified by the
state is a necessary, compelling governmental interest
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which Amendment 2 is narrowly tailored to advance.
Lumping them together as one grandiose (and rather
ill- defined) interest makes them no more necessary,
compelling, or narrowly tailored. In this context, the
whole is equal, and is as equally deficient as the sum
of its parts.
IV
Defendants next argue that the provisions of
Amendment 2 are severable and that only those
provisions pertaining to "sexual orientation" should be
stricken as unconstitutional: "Plaintiffs have only
challenged . . . the question of sexual orientation.
They have not claimed or made any suggestion that
Amendment 2's restrictions concprning homosexual or
bisexual conduct, practices, and relationships are in
any way constitutionally suspect."
In so arguing, defendants not only
mischaracterize plaintiffs' position, but fundamentally
misconstrue the intent of Amendment 2. In Evans I,
we held that Amendment 2 had been shown to a
reasonable probability to be unconstitutional on the
grounds that it affected "the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process . . . by
'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of
persons. . . ." Id. at 1282. The constitutional
infirmity of Amendment 2 recognized in Evans I was
not limited to sexual orientation as opposed to
restrictions concerning homosexual or bisexual
conduct, practices, and relationships. To the contrary,
it was based on the fact that Amendment 2 sought to
deny an independently identifiable group's right to
participate equally in the political process.
We hold that the portions of Amendment 2 that
would remain if only the provision concerning sexual
orientation were stricken are not autonomous and
thus, not severable. In addition to denying the right of
equal participation in the political process to a group
based on sexual orientation, Amendment 2 also is
intended to deny that same right to persons based on
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual . . conduct,
practices or relationships. . . ."
Amendment 2 targets this class of persons based
on four characteristics: sexual orientation; conduct;
practices, and relationships. Each characteristic
provides a potentially different way of identifying that
class of persons who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual.
These four characteristics are not truly severable from
one another because each provides nothing more than
a different way of identifying the same class of
persons.
The fact that there is no constitutionally
recognized right to engage in homosexual sodomy, is
irrelevant. Amendment 2 by no stretch of the
imagination seeks to criminalize homosexual sodomy.
While it is true that such a law could be passed and
found constitutional under the United States'
constitution, it does not follow from that fact that
denying the right of an identifiable group (who may or
may not engage in homosexual sodomy) to participate
equally in the political process is also constitutionally
permissible. The government's ability to criminalize
certain conduct does not justify a corresponding
abatement of an independent fundamental right.
V
Last, defendants argue that even if Amendment 2
is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, it is nevertheless a
constitutionally valid exercise of the people's reserved
powers under the Tenth Amendment. In short, the
argument is that the power to amend the state
constitution is reserved to Colorado's voters under the
Tenth Amendment, and even if the voters amend the
state constitution in such a way as to violate the
federal constitution, such an amendment is per se
valid.
In support of this argument, defendants rely on
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 111 S.Ct. 2395,
115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). In Gregory, the Supreme
Court held that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act does not apply to state court judges.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
decisions concerning the necessary qualification of
state court judges "is a decision of the most
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through the
structure of its government and the character of those
who exercise government authority, a state defines
itself as a sovereign." Id. at 460, 111 S.Ct. at 2400.
The court concluded that "Congressional interference
with this decision of the people of Missouri, defining
their constitutional officers, would upset the usual
constitutional balance of federal and state powers."
Gregory applies only to cases involving federal
interference with the qualification of constitutional
officers.
States have no compelling interest in amending
their constitution in ways that violate fundamental
federal rights.
We reject defendants' argument that Amendment
2 is a constitutionally valid exercise of s etate nower
under the Tenth Amendment.
VI
The state has failed to establish that Amendment
2 is necessary to serve any compelling governmental
interest in a narrowly tailored way. Amendment 2 is
not severable and not a valid exercise of state power
under the Tenth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court's entry of a permanent injunction
barring its enforcement.
Justice SCOTT concurring:
I agree with the majority and join in its opinion
and judgment. Amendment 2 is unconstitutional
because it offends the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. I write separately, nevertheless, to
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suggest that Amendment 2 impermissibly burdens the
right "peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances," a right
guaranteed to every citizen. Hence, the district court's
permanent injunction should be upheld under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I
Citizenship, not the good graces of the electorate,
is the currency of our republican form of government.
Over 130 years ago, this nation was engaged in a great
Civil War which tested our constitutional form of
government as has no other time in our history. That
great battle, joined to address issues of slavery and
race, actually resolved much more. History teaches us
that, in fact, our nation addressed a question of
paramount importance: whether any state may, by
legislative enactment or popular referendum, deny or
refute the Union of the several states and render
asunder the bonds of our constitutional form of
government. Although answered at Appomatox, today
we are called upon to answer, if not resolve, that
question once more.
The federal Constitution, as submitted to the
various states, created certain rights which the states
cannot diminish. By joining the Union, Colorado
"cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, sovereign
power, on [which] . . . no other restrictions are
imposed than may be found in its own Constitution."
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 85, 135, 3 L.Ed.
162 (1810). Writing for the court in Fletcher, Chief
Justice Marshall opined that each state "is a part of a
large empire, . . . is a member of the American Union;
and that Union has a constitution, the supremacy of
which all acknowledge, and which imposes limits to
. the several states, which none claim a right to
pass." Id. Thus, within the limits of state sovereignty,
most important questions are decided by the electorate.
However, those matters in which the result intrudes
upon a protected liberty or fundamental right cannot
be determined in the voting booth.
The frame-rs originally recogrni7e thic notentiat
for harm and understood that not every issue can be
resolved by the vote of a majority. In The Federalist
Papers, James Madison identified the covenant of "a
well constructed Union" as its promise to protect and
preserve inviolate certain rights of all citizens. The
Federalist No. 10, at 42 (J. Madison) (Wills 1982).
Madison noted that under other forms of government,
"measures are too often decided, not according to the
rules ofjustice, and the rights of the minor party; but
by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing
majority." Id. at 43. Madison further stated: The
interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place.. . . If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You
must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control
itself... It is of great importance in a republic, not
only to guard the society against the oppression of its
rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the
injustice of the other part. Id., No. 51, at 262 & 264.
Appropriately, Madison suggested, the "cure" rests in
a republican form of government - a Union in which
there is a "tendency to break and control the violence
of faction." Id., No. 10 at 42. The obligation to
"guard one part of the society against the injustice of
the other part" exists whether the oppressive act is the
result of referendum or other state action. Hence,
every individual is promised full citizenship under a
written Constitution which, as Justice Harlan opined,
"neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
II
A
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution declares: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. . . ." U.S. Const. amend XIV, section 1. The
Fourteenth Amendment, in section 1, made state
citizenship derivative of national citizenship and
transferred to the federal government a portion of each
state's control over civil and political rights.
By the force of an unfortunate history and a
refusal to rely upon the plain text of the constitution,
our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has resulted
in a Privileges or Immunities Clause that has been
eclipsed by the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. As a consequence, no important line of
decision rests solely on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Early on, in fact, the original understanding
was virtually written out of the Constitution by the
United States Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).
In the Slaughter-House Cases, decided in 1873, a
majority of the Court acknowledged the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
limited its effects to those rights earlier existing under
Article IV, without recognizing the creation of a new
national citizenship. In his opinion for the Court in
Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller declared that
the rights conferred by national citizenship were those
"which owe their existence to the Federal government,
its National character, its Constitution, or its laws."
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79, 21 L.Ed. 394. A review of
the legislative history, however, will not permit such
an ambivalent view. The statements of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Howard and
Representative Bingham, confirm that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was originally intended to
confer and make inviolate certain minimal rights




The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the right to vote is fundamental to the rights
of citizenship and to a free and democratic society.
By "participate equally," although not assuring any
political result, we did contemplate the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for a redress of grievances. This right to
participate, an attribute of the new national
citizenship, was meant by the framers of, the
Fourteenth Amendment to be a personal right
guaranteed and secured by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
It should be axiomatic that the right peaceably to
assemble and petition government implies the ability
of the duly elected representatives to respond, if so
persuaded or predisposed. Yet, if enforced,
Amendment 2 provides that the state, acting "through
any of its branches or departments, or any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts," shall not "enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy" granting to
citizens a "claim of discrimination" based on
homosexual or lesbian status or sexual orientation.
Because it would prevent the General Assembly or
other legislative bodies from enacting or adopting
certain new laws and bar the executive department
and its agencies from enforcing existing laws,
Amendment 2 effectively denies the right to petition
or participate in the political process by voiding, ab
initio, redress from discrimination. Like the right to
vote which assumes the right to have one's vote
counted, the right peaceably to assemble and petition
is meaningless if by law government is powerless to
act.
IV
Courts have been reluctant to develop a working
constitutional analysis under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause since the Slaughter-House Cases,
and, unfortunately, have instead built upon the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause. The Equal
Protection Clause, burdened by a history and analysis
beyond this context, is not the most appropriate of the
Fourteenth Amendment provisions for securing the
right to participate equally in the political process and
yet it is the primary mode of analysis relied upon by
the majority in this case.
Certainly all must now agree that the Fourteenth
Amendment sought to protect citizens from oppression
by state government. The Equal Protection Clause of
that amendment mandates that rights afforded to some
are granted equally to all. From time to time the acts
of government intervene in the lives of its citizens.
Under the Equal Protection Doctrine, such
government intervention is subjected to review,
applying at least one of three standards: strict
scrutiny, intermediate review, or rational basis
analysis. The applicable standard of review to be
applied depends upon the characteristics or attributes
of the citizens involved. Under the Equal Protection
Doctrine, when such governmental intervention
occurs, such as with the enactment of Amendment 2
in this case, regardless of the standard applied, it is
contemplated that certain abridgements of even
fundamental rights are acceptable. For example,
under the strict scrutiny test, the most exacting
standard and that applied by the majority, state action
is "constitutionally permissible ... if it is 'necessary to
promote a compelling state interest,' and [the state]
does so in the least restrictive manner possible."
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause guarantees citizens that certain
fundamental rights of national citizenship are
inviolate, absent due process.
The syntax of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause
seems inescapably that of substantive entitlement.
According to Ely, "the slightest attention to language
will indicate that it is the Equal Protection Clause that
follows the command of equality strategy, while the
Privileges or Immunities Clause proceeds by
purporting to extend to everyone a set of entitlements."
Ely at 24. The importance of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is that it does not require varying
standards of review and that its protections are
extended to every citizen.
V
Under Amendment 2, the rights of citizens
"peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for a redress of grievances" so as to participate freely
and equally in the political process are compromised
in a manner prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because these political rights are fundamental and
inherent in national citizenship they are protected by
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Accordingly, I
concur.
Justice ERICKSON dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In Evans v. Romer, 854
P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (Evans I), cert. denied, --- U.S.
114 S.Ct. 419, 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993), the majority
crafted a new fundamental right that had never been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court or by
any court other than a federal district court in Ohio
that relied on Evans I. Ironically, judicial review of
Amendment 2 has accomplished exactly what the
voters who passed Amendment 2 sought to
prevent--the majority has effectively created a
heightened protection for homosexuals, lesbians, and
bisexuals.
In establishing what is essentially a new
substantive due process right disguised as a previously
unrecognized "fundamental right," the majority
disregarded the warnings of Chief Justice Burger, who
stated in his dissent to Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
244, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2409, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982):
"If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly
result-oriented approach, this case is a prime
example." Chief Justice Burger stated: Were it our
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business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree
without hesitation that it is senseless for an
enlightened society to deprive any children-including
illegal aliens-of an elementary education. . . .
However, the Constitution does not constitute us as
"Platonic Guardians" nor does it vest in this Court the
authority to strike down laws because they do not meet
our standards of desirable social policy, "wisdom," or
"common sense." We trespass on the assigned
function of the political branches under our structure
of limited and separated powers when we assume a
policymaking role as the Court does today.
The majority opinion has overlooked a crucial
aspect of the case before us: we are not evaluating an
act of the legislature or pronouncement of the
executive-we are reviewing a constitutional
amendment adopted by the people of the State of
Colorado. While there are certainly some initiated
constitutional amendments that a majority of the
electorate may attempt to visit on a minority that will
not pass constitutional scrutiny, we must not ignore
the fact that we are reviewing the expressed will of the
citizens of this state.
In Evans I, we remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the preliminary injunction
sustained by a majority of this court should be made
permanent The district court, following Evans I with
great precision, made extensive findings and made the
preliminary injunction permanent. Nevertheless,
people of homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation
have never been adjudicated to be a protected class
and the right to participate equally in the political
process has never been determined, apart from Evans
I, to be a fundamental right. Accordingly, I would
employ a rational relation standard to Amendment 2
and vacate the permanent injunction. For the reasons
set forth in my dissent to Evans I, and for the reasons
set forth below, I respectfully dissent.
I
The majority relies on Evans I and applies the
strict scrutiny standard of review to Amendment 2
becA~ause, IL Ihat Lh Eq uAl Poetn lause of
the United States Constitution guarantees the
fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process. Maj. op. at 1339; Evans 1, 854 P.2d
at 1276. Evans I established this standard of review
by assembling several United States Supreme Court
decisions and interpreting their collective teachings as
implying a new fundamental right. In my view, no
fundamental right or suspect class is implicated by
Amendment 2, and therefore the standard of judicial
scrutiny applied by the majority is erroneous.
A
The majority in Evans I extensively reviewed
many United States Supreme Court decisions to reach
its conclusion, and emphasized a line of cases relating
to citizen participation in the political process. The
majority in Evans I interpreted these cases to create
the fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process. Properly understood, however, these
cases involve suspect classifications and not the
alleged fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process.
In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct.
557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969), the United States
Supreme Court addressed a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the federal constitution. Hunter
involved a city charter amendment that repealed a
racial anti-discrimination ordinance and required
-voter -action before such an ordinance could be
enacted. Id. at 387, 89 S.Ct. at 558. Although Hunter
involved the political process, the Court invalidated
the amendment because it created an unjustified
distinction based on race. The Court held: Because
the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of meaningful and unjustified official
distinctions based on race, racial classifications are
"constitutionally suspect," and subject to the "most
rigid scrutiny." They "bear a far heavier burden of
justification" than other classifications. . .
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,
458 U.S. 457, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982),
the Court applied Hunter and struck down a state-wide
initiative to terminate the use of busing to achieve
racial integration in the public schools. In finding
that the initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause,
the Supreme Court held: [T]he political majority may
generally restructure the political process to place
obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the
benefits of governmental action. But a different
analysis is required when the State allocates
governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using
the racial nature of a decision to determine the
decisionmaking process. State action of this kind, the
Court said, "places special burdens on racial
minorities within the governmental process," thereby
"making it more difficult for certain racial and
religious minorities than for other members of the
community to achieve legislation that is in their
interest." Id. at 470, 102 S.Ct. at 3195 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted). The Court thus did not
approve of "distinctions based on race" and struck
down the initiative because it would hnve nr,- tM
additional burdens for a class of citizens who have had
historical difficulty in changing the political process.
A similar issue was addressed in Crawford v.
Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 102 S.Ct. 3211, 73
L.Ed.2d 948 (1982), which was announced on the
same day as Washington. In Crawford, the Court
upheld a state constitutional amendment that
prohibited state courts from ordering mandatory
student assignment or transportation. The Court
stated that if the constitutional amendment employed
a racial classification such as the classification in
Hunter, the Court would apply the strict scrutiny
standard of review, but found Hunter inapplicable
because the amendment at issue did not "embody a
racial classification."
The fact that the fundamental right created by the
majority in Evans I has never been recognized by the
Supreme Court is evident in two cases, James v.
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Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d
678 (1971), and Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct.
1889, 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971). In James and Gordon,
the Court could have used the fundamental right found
in Evans I and applied strict scrutiny review to strike
down constitutional measures. Instead, in both cases,
the Court upheld the provisions and refused to apply
the strict scrutiny standard enunciated in Hunter.
In James, the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of a California constitutional measure that prohibited
state public bodies from developing, constructing, or
acquiring low-income housing projects until voters
approved of the project in a referendum. Thus, the
citizens singled out in James were low-income people
who would qualify for low-rent housing and therefore
the Court did not apply strict scrutiny. The Supreme
Court said: Unlike the case before us, Hunter rested on
the conclusion that Akron's referendum law denied
equal protection by placing "special burdens on racial
minorities within the governmental process." . .
Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be
said that California's Article XXXIV rests on
"distinctions based on race." . . . The present case
could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this
we decline to do.
Similarly, in Gordon, the plaintiffs challenged
West Virginia's constitutional provision that required
a sixty-percent approval for any bonded indebtedness
incurred by the political subdivisions of the state. As
in James, the Supreme Court did not apply the strict
scrutiny standard of review because: Unlike the
restrictions in our previous cases, the West Virginia
Constitution singles out no "discrete and insular
minority" for special treatment. . . . We are not,
therefore, presented with a case like Hunter, in
which fair housing legislation alone was subject to an
automatic referendum requirement. The class singled
out in Hunter was clear-"those who would benefit
from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral
discriminations." James and Gordon demonstrate that
strict scrutiny should not be applied to review a
restriction on the political process unless the
retriction singles out a discrete and insular minority,
The Supreme Court of the United States has never
held, however, that the right to participate equally in
the political process is a fundamental right.
B
The development of fundamental rights in our
jurisprudence has never been a matter for ad hoc
determination. Fundamental rights must be explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. Among the fundamental rights
delineated by the Supreme Court are the right to vote,
the right to interstate travel, the right to privacy, and
the guarantees contained in the First Amendment.
The Court has been reluctant to recognize new
rights as fundamental. The Court has refused to
declare education, housing, the right to refuse medical
treatment, welfare payments, or governmental
employment to be fundamental rights worthy of
heightened constitutional protection. Never before has
any court recognized the right to participate equally in
the political process as a fundamental right, the
curtailing of which warrants strict judicial scrutiny.
"It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."
It is crucial to note, however, that even though
equal participation in the political process does not
merit strict scrutiny analysis, the United States
Constitution offers protection for those who may be
adversely affected by legislation. When individuals or
groups are singled out, as they have been here, they
may still be protected by the Due Process Clauses or
the Equal Protection Clause. In this case, the class of
citizens is protected by the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, Amendment 2 must be struck down only
if its challengers can demonstrate that the legislation
is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
II
During oral argument before this court, counsel
for the plaintiffs- appellees asserted that even if strict
scrutiny review were inappropriate, we should analyze
Amendment 2 under a rational basis standard of
review. Counsel noted that in Heller v. Doe by Doe,
-- U.S. --- , -, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d
257 (1993), the Supreme Court did not engage in
strict scrutiny review because it was not properly
preserved at the lower levels and therefore urged this
court not to preclude rational basis review by ruling
merely under strict scrutiny standards. I find counsel's
contention persuasive and therefore address
Amendment 2 under a rational relation standard.
A
In reviewing an act of the legislature or a
voter-mandated constitutional amendment that creates
a classification involving neither a fundamental right
nor suspect classes, a court will review the
classification under the "rational basis" standard of
review. Under the rational basis standard of review,
the classification will be "upheld against equal
protecuon chalenge if mere is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.
The inquiry into whether there is a rational basis
for the classification, however, does not authorize "the
judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations." Instead, a classification that involves
neither suspect classes nor fundamental rights is
accorded a strong presumption of validity.
Because of the strong presumption of validity, the
purpose or rationale behind the legislation need not be
articulated at any time. Additionally, the party
challenging the classification bears the burden of
"negatfing] every conceivable basis which might
support it" whether or not it is supported by the
record.
57
In an effort to ensure that rational basis review
does not become a "license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices," the
reasons articulated are given great deference. This is
so because: The Constitution presumes that, absent
some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a
political branch has acted. Thus, we will not overturn
such a statute unless the varying treatment of different
groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement
of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can
only conclude that the legislature's actions were
irrational. Although the purposes and rationale of a
voter initiative are even more difficult to assess than
legislative pronouncements, initiatives passed by the
citizens of the state which contain classifications not
related to fundamental rights or suspect classes are
also given deference.
It is the prerogative of the people of the State of
Colorado, and not this or any other court, to weigh the
evidence and determine the wisdom and utility of the
purposes behind a measure adopted through the
initiative process. Thus, whether in fact Amendment
2 will meet its objectives is not the relevant question:
the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if the people of
Colorado could have rationally decided that
prohibiting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals from
enacting certain legislation might further a legitimate
interest.
Amendment 2 was put to a plebiscite by initiative
petitions and eventually won voter approval by
813,966 votes to 710,151 votes. Because Amendment
2 was a product of a vote of the citizens of Colorado,
no purpose or rationale for Amendment 2 was
explicitly set forth. However, the state has articulated
several rationale in this court and in the district court
to establish that the interest behind Amendment 2 is
not only a rational interest but also a compelling state
interest.
III
Although only one legitimate state interest
rationally related to the state's goals for a
constitutional amendment is necessary, the state has
set forth several. The district court found that two
rationale--the promotion of religious freedom and the
promotion of family privacy--demonstrated
compelling state interests, although it found that the
means for achieving the interests were not narrowly
tailored to achieve the objectives. In my view, there
are at least three interests that satisfy the
constitutional standard and those asserting the
invalidity of Amendment 2 have not met their burden
of demonstrating that there is no rational basis for the
constitutional amendment.
A
The state asserts that the rational basis of
Amendment 2 is that it prevents the government from
interfering with religious privacy. The root of the
state's contention is that under ordinances preempted
by Amendment 2, individual landlords or employers,
including churches, who have profound religious
objections to homosexuality, would nonetheless be
compelled to compromise those convictions under
threat of government sanctions. Thus, Amendment 2
prevents any political body from enacting legislation
that would hinder the right of individuals to choose
who to rent to or who to employ on religious grounds.
The district court found that "[p]reserving religious
freedom is a compelling state interest" but that
Amendment 2 was "not narrowly drawn to achieve
that purpose in the least restrictive manner possible."
Freedom of individuals to practice and hold
particular religious beliefs is among the highest values
in our society. It is not within the discretion of this or
any court to determine which beliefs are valid because
"courts are not the arbiters of scriptural
interpretation." In fact, "religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit [free exercise] protection."
Not only is it impermissible for courts to determine the
validity of religious practices and beliefs, but no
government official or body may delineate what is a
"proper" form of faith and require citizens to act in
accordance with government- mandated religious
standards.
Nevertheless, not all burdens on religion are
unconstitutional. Even the highest values, including
religious freedom, must sometimes give way to the
greater public good. Thus, governmental actions that
substantially burden a religious practice must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest.
In this case, the state asserts that Amendment 2 is
an attempt to protect religious freedom by precluding
legislation that would threaten sanctions against those
who would refuse to employ or rent to homosexuals,
lesbians, and bisexuals. The state indicates several
examples of instances in which individuals or groups
were forced to set aside their religious beliefs based on
legislative enactments protecting homosexuals. In
Aspen, for example, section 13-98 of the sexual
onentaton ordinance required churches to open their
facilities to homosexual organizations if the facilities
were opened to any community organization.
Churches apparently could not refuse to hire
employees, including pastors or priests, on the basis of
their sexual orientation. Similarly, Title 12 of the
Boulder Municipal Code did not allow a church or
religious organization with deeply held moral and
religious views on the subject of homosexuality to
refuse to hire someone based on his or her sexual
orientation.
In my view, the state has a legitimate interest in
protecting religious freedoms and Amendment 2 bears
a rational relationship to that interest.
B
Although the district court found that the state did
not have a compelling interest in deterring
"factionalism," or "political fragmentation," the state
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does have a legitimate interest in promoting state-wide
uniformity and Amendment 2 is rationally related to
that interest.
Prohibiting local action on matters affecting the
entire state is advantageous inasmuch as the state has
an interest in uniformity of regulation: The central
inquiry implicit in the concept of pre-emption is
whether there should be statewide uniformity in the
regulation of specific conduct. If there is no need for
statewide uniformity, there is no need for state law to
preempt local power to regulate . .. This is the core of
the preemption question-to consider, on the one hand,
the need for statewide uniformity of regulation of a
specific type of conduct, and, on the other hand, the
need of local governments to be able to respond to
local, as distinguished from statewide problems.
In this case, the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting Amendment 2 because it is a matter of
statewide concern. Amendment 2 involves a matter of
statewide concern because the public is deeply divided
over the issue of homosexuality. In fact, civil rights
has never been the type of concern reserved
exclusively for local governments. By adopting
Amendment 2, the people of the state have sought to
ensure that the government will act on a uniform
basis. Several local governments, such as Denver,
Aspen, and Boulder enacted sexual orientation laws,
while others did not. By voting to approve
Amendment 2, the voters of Colorado indicated that
they wanted a statewide resolution of the issue that
had formerly only been locally regulated and subject
to great debate. The citizens of the state have a right
to the initiative process which resolves conflicts
between municipal and local governments when the
issue is a matter of statewide concern and the process
is not repugnant to the constitution. The Supreme
Court has noted that "referendums demonstrate
devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or
prejudice."
In my view, the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting sntpaxrie uniformitv in matters of stateudde
concern and Amendment 2 bears a rational
relationship to that interest.
C
The state also contends that it has a legitimate
interest in allocating its resources. Specifically, the
state suggests that laws prohibited by Amendment 2
would drain the state's financial and labor resources
set aside and budgeted for the protection of
traditionally suspect classes and diminish respect for
traditional civil rights categories.
In this case, the testimony reflected that, although
there was no current statute that required the state to
enforce civil rights legislation on behalf of
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, any such statute
would decrease the funding available to enforce
existing laws protecting traditionally suspect classes.
For example, the investigative arm of the Civil Rights
Commission has experienced steadily increasing
demands upon a shrinking budget. Two out of the last
three years, the Division has been unable to fulfill its
part of a federally funded work-share agreement. The
Division received complaints from the black
community that claims were not being thoroughly
investigated and prosecuted. The state, therefore,
reasonably postulates that a law requiring the
protection of an additional group would further stretch
scarce resources, and Amendment 2 protects the civil
rights enforcement for traditionally suspect groups.
Thus, the decision of the people of the State of
Colorado to allocate government resources in a
particular manner is a legitimate state interest in this
case.
Additionally, the state has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that the traditionally suspect classes remain
respected. Professor Joseph Broadus testified that the
addition of homosexuals to civil rights statutes or
ordinances would lessen the public's respect for
historic civil rights categories. Testimony also
indicated that, unlike the traditionally suspect classes,
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals are a relatively
politically powerful and privileged special interest
group. Indeed, former Civil Rights Commission
Chairman Ignacio Rodriguez testified that the
inclusion of homosexuals as a suspect class would
represent a "drastic departure" from the historical
aims of the civil rights laws.
The State of Colorado, through entities such as
the Colorado Civil Rights Division, has attempted to
further the interest in remedying specific instances of
sexual and racial discrimination through existing civil
rights laws and enforcement programs. However,
owing to the fiscal constraints which are inevitably a
part of public administration, unlimited funds are not
available for this purpose. Therefore, it is incumbent
upon the state to set priorities for its enforcement
efforts. In this case, the setting of priorities is a
legitimate state interest and Amendment 2 is
rationally related to that interest.
IV
In my view, the correct standard of judicial review
of Amendment 2 is a rational basis standard of review.
Additionally, the plaintiffs have not shown that
Amendment 2 is not rationally related to the state's
legitimate interest in protecting religious freedom,
encouraging statewide uniformity in the law, and
allocating resources. Accordingly, I would reverse the
decision of the district court and vacate the injunction.
Therefore, I dissent.
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[A] State may no more disadvantage any
particular group by making it more difficult to enact
legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size.
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1992, a majority of Colorado
voters approved an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution, commonly known as "Amendment 2."
This measure sought to repeal existing statutes,
regulations, ordinances and policies of state and
local entities that bar discrimination based on sexual
orientation. More significantly, it aimed to ban any
future laws that would recognize claims of
discrimination by gay men, lesbians and bisexuals.
Following Amendment 2's passage, a group of
individual and government plaintiffs filed suit in
state court against the State of Colorado challenging
the constitutionality of Amendment 2. After the
plaintiffs' request for an expedited hearing on the
merits was rejected, they filed a motion to
preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of Amendment
2. To grant the injunction, the court had to
determine, inter alia, that the plaintiffs were likely
to win the case in a full hearing on the merits. The
trial court held that Amendment 2 burdened the
fundamental constitutional right of an "identifiable
class" (namely gay men, lesbians and bisexuals) "not
to have the State endorse and give effect to private
biases" under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
and announced that it would apply strict scrutiny to
Amend ent 2 in the fuill hearingon the merits.
Using this level of scrutiny, the court would most
likely hold Amendment 2 unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the trial court granted the plaintiffs'
motion to preliminarily enjoin execution of
Amendment 2.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court in
Evans v. Romer affirmed the issuance of the
preliminary injunction by a vote of six to one.
However, the court disregarded the particulars of the
trial court's fundamental rights analysis and
independently reviewed the question of whether
Amendment 2 violated an existing constitutional
righL Noting that Amendment 2 aimed to single out
and prohibit gay men, lesbians and bisexuals from
seeking governmental action favorable to them, the
Evans majority held that Amendment 2 infringed
upon the fundamental constitutional right of an
"independently identifiable class of persons ... to
participate- equally-in the political process" under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because Amendment 2 would thus be
required to withstand strict scrutiny in a full hearing
on the merits, the court concluded that the measure
would most likely be held unconstitutional.
In response to this holding, one supreme court
justice issued a spirited dissent criticizing the
majority's "erroneous" recognition of the group right
to participate equally in the political process. Justice
Erickson stated that "at no point has the Supreme
Court explicitly identified the fundamental right that
the majority extrapolates from the Supreme Court
decisions on which it relies." Citing one case in
particular where the Supreme Court seemed to
explicitly refuse to recognize such a right, Justice
Erickson admonished the majority, stating that "a
state court cannot impose a restriction as a matter of
federal constitutional law that the Supreme Court
has specifically refrained from adopting."
This Note considers whether the Evans majority
correctly held that the Supreme Court has effectively
recognized the group right to equal participation in
the political process under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After
analyzing the opinions of the trial judge, the Evans
majority and Justice Erickson, the Note argues that
the Supreme Court has effectively recognized such
a right, and that the Evans majority was correct to
rule that Amendment 2 must withstand strict
scrutiny in order to be upheld. In closing, the Note
argues that the consequent constitutional demise of
Colorado Amendment 2 should serve to stifle similar
legislative efforts in other states that seek to exclude
gays, lesbians, bisexuals and other identifiable
groups from the political process.
H. EVANS V. ROMER
When the plaintiffs filed suit in the Colorado
District Court in Denver County, they based their
challenge on a variety of state and federal grounds.
The individual plaintiffs claimed that Amendment
2 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to
equal protection because it failed to rationally
advance a legitimate governmental purpose, and
because it placed unique burdens on the ability of
gays, lesbians and bisexuals to participate equally in
the political process. They also challenged
Amendment 2 on First Amendment grounds,
claiming it violated their right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances, their right to
free expression and association, the prohibition
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against the establishment of religion, and finally,
that Amendment 2 was unconstitutionally vague.
The individual plaintiffs also asserted that the voter
initiative process, by which Amendment 2 was
adopted, violated the Guarantee Clause of Article
IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, they
alleged that the amendment prohibited state courts
from enforcing laws addressing discrimination based
on sexual orientation and, as a result, the measure
violated the Supremacy and Due Process Clauses of
the federal Constitution, and Article II, Section 6 of
the Colorado Constitution.
Two of the governmental plaintiffs urged that
Amendment 2 violated their home rule powers.
Another asserted that Amendment 2 violated local
control over educational policies protected by the
Colorado Constitution. All of the governmental
plaintiffs claimed that the measure would subject
them to potential liability under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
A. The Colorado District Court: A Question of
Prejudice
After the trial court rejected the plaintiffs'
request for an expedited hearing on the merits, they
moved for a preliminary injunction against the
execution of Amendment 2. The plaintiffs argued
that Amendment 2 deprived them of their First
Amendment right of free expression and their
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of
the laws, insofar as it denied gay men, lesbians and
bisexuals the opportunity to participate equally in
the political process.
In ruling upon this motion, the trial court was
bound by the six-part test of Rathke v. MacFarlane.
Under that test, a preliminary injunction may only
be granted if the moving party can establish that
injunctive relief is necessary to protect existing
fundamental constitutional rights or existing
legitimate property rights. The trial court found that
Amendment 2 burdened the fundamental
constitutional right of an "independently identifiable
group . ... not to have the State encarce and give
effect to private biases" under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the
trial court would thereby apply strict scrutiny to
Amendment 2 in a full hearing on the merits, and
because the court would thereby most likely hold
Amendment 2 unconstitutional, the court granted
the plaintiffs' motion to preliminarily enjoin the
enforcement of Amendment 2.
In identifying this particular fundamental right
under the Equal Protection Clause, the trial court
primarily relied upon two U.S. Supreme Court cases,
Reitman v. Mulkey and Palmore v. Sidoti, and one
Ninth Circuit case, Pruitt v. Cheney.
In Reitman v. Mulkey, the Supreme Court
considered whether a voterinitiated amendment to
the California Constitution, commonly known as
"Proposition 14," denied the plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights. Proposition 14
repealed prior state laws prohibiting residential
property owners from discriminating against
prospective buyers and renters on the basis of race.
When the plaintiffs filed suit claiming that a
landlord had refused to rent to them on the basis of
their race, the defendant moved for summary
judgment, claiming that Proposition 14 precluded
the plaintiffs' claim. In holding for the plaintiffs,
the Reitman Court accepted the analysis of the
California Supreme Court that the intent of
Proposition 14 was to authorize private racial
discrimination in the housing market, and that it
effectively created a constitutional right to
discriminate on racial grounds in the sale and
leasing of property. Because under Proposition 14,
the right to discriminate would have become "one of
the basic policies of the State," the Supreme Court
concluded that Proposition 14 was invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Drawing upon this conclusion, the
Evans trial court characterized the Reitman decision
as the Supreme Court's first articulation of a
fundamental right not to have the state endorse and
give effect to private biases.
In Palmore v. Sidoti, the petitioner and
respondent, both white, had obtained a divorce
decree awarding the petitioner custody of the
couple's three year old daughter. Later, the
respondent sought custody of the child by filing a
petition to modify the prior judgment because of
changed conditions; namely, that the petitioner now
cohabited with a black man. The respondent argued
that his daughter would likely be victimized by
others because of her having to live in a
racially-mixed household. In reviewing the state
court's decision to grant the respondent's petition,
the Supreme Court considered "whether the reality
of private biases and the possible injury they might
inflict are permissible considerations for removal of
an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother." The Court held that such considerations
were not permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause, and overruled the state court's decision to
grant the respondent's petition. In a unanimous
opinion, the Palmore Court declared: "The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect." The Evans
trial court considered this rule a restatement of the
same fundamental constitutional right it found
articulated by the Supreme Court in Reitman.
Finally, the Evans trial court cited Pruitt v.
Cheney, a Ninth Circuit case invoking the Palmore
Rule outside the context of racial discrimination.
Here, a former Army Reserve officer brought a First
Amendment action against the Army challenging
regulations compelling her discharge because of her
acknowledged homosexuality. Although the Pruitt
court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs First
Amendment claim, it allowed her complaint to go
forward on equal protection grounds. In remanding
61
the case to the trial court with instructions to apply
an "active" rationality review to the Army
regulations challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center had
extended the Palmore rule beyond the context of
racial discrimination.
From this, the Evans trial court concluded that
the fundamental right established under Reitman
and Palmore provided-a cognizable basis for the
plaintiffs' claim against Amendment 2, even though
the measure was not racially discriminatory.
Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion
to preliminarily enjoin Amendment 2, holding that
the measure infringed upon a fundamental
constitutional right, and that as a result, the court
would most likely hold Amendment 2
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny in a full
hearing on the merits.
It is important to note, however, that neither
Reitman, Palmore nor Cleburne expressly
recognized the fundamental right identified and
relied on by the Evans trial court. As a result, the
court's decision to grant the plaintiffs' motion to
preliminarily enjoin enforcement of Amendment 2
was, arguably, without support. Nonetheless, the
trial court's analysis is not without merit, at least in
regard to the question of Amendment 2's ultimate
constitutionality. Specifically, by invoking, through
Pruitt, the Supreme Court's concern about
"irrational" prejudice in Cleburne, and by implying
the existence of private biases and prejudices behind
the passage of Amendment 2, the Evans trial court
furnished an approach whereby Amendment 2 could
be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause,
even if the measure cannot be shown to have
infringed on a fundamental constitutional right.
In Cleburne, the Supreme Court invalidated the
legislation that discriminated against mentally
retarded individuals, not because a fundamental
right was at stake, but because the ordinance failed
to withstand the Court's "active" rationality review.
The Court struck the measure because it employed
an impermissible basis for its legislative
classification; specifically, it gave effect to an
"irrational" prejudice against mentally retarded
people.
In the same way, if the court ultimately
determines that Amendment 2 rested on an
irrational prejudice against gay men, lesbians and
bisexuals, the court may invalidate Amendment 2 by
applying the Cleburne "active" rationality review
test, and holding that the measure employed an
impermissible basis for its legislative classification
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While this approach is probably not
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Ratlike v.
MacFarlane and support the issuance of a
preliminary injunction against Amendment 2, it
does provide a strong argument that the measure is
ultimately unconstitutional.
B. The Colorado Supreme Court Majority: A
Question of Process
On appeal, the plaintiffs presented the same
equal protection arguments to the Colorado Supreme
Court that they made to the trial court. While the
plaintiffs conceded the infirmity of the fundamental
right identified and relied upon by the trial court,
they urged the supreme court to construe the lower
court's analysis "in light of the arguments actually
-presented to [it,] -that Amendment 2 violates the
plaintiffs' fundamental right of political
participation." The supreme court refused to follow
this route, however, and independently reviewed the
question of whether Amendment 2 infringed upon
an existing constitutional right under the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Evans majority anchored its de novo review
upon two primary assertions: first, that "the Equal
Protection Clause ... applies to all citizens, and not
simply those who are members of traditionally
'suspect' classes such as racial or ethnic minorities,"
and second, that "the right of citizens to participate
in the process of government is a core democratic
value which has been recognized from the very
inception of [the] Republic up to the present time."
With these two assertions affixed in place, the
majority set out in search of a fundamental
constitutional right for groups to participate equally
in the political process.
The search primarily consisted of invocations of
U.S. Supreme Court cases expressing the value the
Court places on the ability of individuals to
participate in the political process. The majority
organized these cases under two categories for
analysis. In the first category, the court primarily
looked to Kramer v. Union Free School District No.
15, Reynolds v. Sims, and Williams v. Rhodes, all
cases dealing with voting rights. While the Evans
majority did not consider these cases dispositive of
Amendment 2, it argued that they demonstrated that
"[tjhe Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
fundamental right to participate equally in the
political proces and thus, any a Ittempt to inf1rige o
that right must be subject to strict scrutiny and can
be held constitutionally valid only if supported by a
compelling state interest."
The second and more important group of cases
for analysis consisted of Hunter v. Erickson,
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 and
Gordon v. Lance. Each of these equal protection
cases considered legislation that sought to prevent or
limit the normal political processes from enacting
legislation desired by an identifiable group of voters.
In Hunter v. Erickson, the Supreme Court
invalidated a city charter amendment enacted by the
voters of Akron, Ohio that required any fair housing
legislation passed by the city council to be ratified by
a public referendum, whereas other ordinances could
be enacted directly by the city council. The Court
held that the charter amendment violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it selectively imposed
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heavier electoral burdens on laws favored by groups
opposing racial, ethnic and religious discrimination
in housing. In effect, the law placed a "special
burden" on racial minorities within the
governmental process. According to the Court,
"[tihis is no more permissible than denying them the
vote, on an equal basis with others."
Of fundamental importance to the Evans
majority, the Hunter Court proffered a sweeping
declaration: "[T]he State may no more disadvantage
any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size."
Significantly, the Court supported this proposition
by citing two cases having nothing to do with racial
discrimination or any other traditionally suspect
class of persons. Therefore, according to Evans,
Hunter established that the Equal Protection Clause
affords any particular group, be it racial or
otherwise, the fundamental constitutional right to
participate equally in the political process.
To bolster its interpretation of Hunter, the
Evans majority invoked Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1. In that case, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a voter
initiative which attempted to prohibit local school
districts from utilizing mandatory busing as a means
of achieving desegregation. Relying on Hunter, the
Washington Court held that the voters, in passing
the initiative, had impermissibly interfered with the
political process and unlawfully burdened the efforts
of minority groups to secure public benefits.
Of significance to Evans, the Washington Court
embraced the "neutral principles" formulation
articulated by Justice Harlan in Hunter, and referred
to it as the "simple but central principle" underlying
the Hunter opinion. The Washington Court thereby
struck the voter initiative because it did "not
attemp[t] to allocate governmental power on the
basis of any general principle." Accordingly, the
Evans court interpreted Washington to stand for the
rule that laws seeking to allocate governmental
power on the basis of something other than a
"general principle" are to be considered
constitutionally suspect. For the Evans majority,
Washington both affirmed the Hunter Doctrine, and
helped demonstrate that it applied outside the
context of racial discrimination.
The Evans majority sought to further validate its
interpretation of Hunter by considering the Supreme
Court's rationale in Gordon v. Lance. In Gordon,
the Court upheld a West Virginia statute that
required approval of any proposed increase in
bonded indebtedness or state tax rates by a sixty
percent majority of voters. The plaintiffs, a group of
individuals who had voted in favor of two proposals
covered by the sixty percent requirement, sought a
declaratory judgment that the requirement was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in reversing the West
Virginia Supreme Court, turned its attention to the
applicability of Hunter. Unlike the Hunter Court's
review of the legislation therein, the Gordon Court
was unable to discern any "independently
identifiable group or category that favors bonded
indebtedness over other forms of financing." As a
result, the Gordon Court upheld the statute,
observing that "no sector of the population may be
said to be 'fenced out' from the franchise because of
the way they will vote." "[So long as such
provisions do not discriminate against any
identifiable class," the Court reasoned, "they do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause."
The Evans majority considered Gordon's
discussion of Hunter significant for two reasons.
First, Gordon invoked Hunter even though the case
had nothing to do with racial minorities or any other
traditionally suspect class. The Evans majority
believed this "strongly suggests that the holding of
Hunter cannot be limited in application only to the
review of legislation which discriminates on the
basis of race." Second, according to the Evans
majority, Gordon placed no significance on the fact
that the class discriminated against in Hunter was a
racial minority. Rather, Gordon distinguished
Hunter because it found no "independently
identifiable" group or category affected by the West
Virginia statute. For the Evans majority, "these
facts clearly support the conclusion that Hunter
applies to a broad spectrum of discriminatory
legislation." Accordingly, the majority declared:
We conclude that the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution
protects the fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process, and that any
legislation or state constitutional amendment
which infringes on this right by "fencing out"
an independently identifiable class of persons
must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Next, the court reviewed Amendment 2 in light of
this fundamental constitutional right.
Briefly noting that Amendment 2 aimed to
repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances and
policies of state and local entities that bar
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the
Evans majority was most troubled by Amendment
2's "ultimate" effect: to prohibit any governmental
entity from adopting similar statutes, regulations,
ordinances or policies in the future unless the state
constitution was first amended to permit such
measures. The court thereby held that Amendment
2 infringed on the plaintiffs' fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process, because
it "expressly fences out an independently identifiable
group," and because it "prohibits this class of
persons from seeking governmental action favorable
to it." "In short, gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
are left out of the political process through the denial
of having an 'effective voice in the governmental
affairs which substantially affect their lives."' As a
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result, the Evans court ruled that Amendment 2
would be tested under strict scrutiny in a full hearing
on the merits, and it thereby affirmed the trial
court's issuance of the preliminary injunction.
C. The Colorado Supreme Court Minority: A
Question of Legislative Classification
Justice Erickson, the sole dissenter in Evans,
modeled his critique of the majority's opinion after
the Supreme Court's approach in Bowers v.
Hardwick. He rejected the majority's holding that
Amendment 2 infringed upon a fundamental
constitutional right, placing heavy reliance on the
Bowers philosophy of judicial restraint: "There
should be . . . great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it
requires redefining the category or rights deemed to
be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily
takes to itself further authority to govern the country
without express constitutional authority." Having
adopted this approach, Justice Erickson proceeded to
analyze Hunter, James v. Valtierra, Gordon and
Washington and argued that, in the end, Hunter only
compels the application of strict scrutiny in cases
involving racially discriminatory legislation.
Accordingly, Justice Erickson would have reversed
the trial court's issuance of the preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of Amendment 2.
Justice Erickson began his analysis by asserting
that the Hunter Court invalidated the Akron charter
amendment specifically because it placed special
burdens on racial minorities within the
governmental process. Therefore, due to the racially
discriminatory nature of the charter amendment, and
because subsequent federal cases invoking Hunter
characterized the opinion as one involving an
unconstitutional racial classification, Justice
Erickson concluded that Hunter was merely a "race"
case, and as such, it provided no support for the
Evans majority's identification of the fundamental
right for groups to participate equally in the political
process.
To bolster this conclusion, Justice Erickson
primarily relied upon James v. Valtierra, an opinion
to which the Evans majority paid only cursory
attention. In that case, black and
Mexican-American indigents challenged Article
XXXIV of the California Constitution, which
provided that no low-rent housing project could be
developed, constructed or acquired in any manner by
a state public body until the project was approved by
a majority of those voting at a community election.
The plaintiffs contended that Article XXXIV
unreasonably discriminated, explicitly against the
poor and implicitly against minority groups. While
the James Court could have invalidated the
legislation by applying the Evans majority's
interpretation of Hunter, it did not. Specifically and
significantly, the James Court stated: "Unlike the
Akron referendum provision [in Hunter], it cannot
be said that California's Article XXXIV rests on
'distinctions based on race. . ' The present case
could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this
we decline to do."'
Justice Erickson found James to be dispositive
of the issue in Evans, and concluded that the
Supreme Court has not yet articulated a fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process.
Justice Erickson reasoned: "[A] straightforward
application of James indicates that the strict scrutiny
standard of review does not apply in this case,"
- since Amendment 2 does not involve any suspect
classification.
Justice Erickson reached the same conclusion by
analyzing Gordon. In particular, he noted the way
in which the Gordon Court distinguished the West
Virginia legislation from the Akron charter
amendment in Hunter: "Unlike the restrictions in
[Hunter], the West Virginia Constitution singles out
no 'discrete and insular minority' for special
treatment. . . . The class singled out in Hunter was
clear - 'those who would benefit from laws barring
racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations."'
Justice Erickson thereby concluded that Gordon is
best understood as "a case where strict scrutiny
analysis did not apply because a suspect
classification was not involved."
Justice Erickson similarly interpreted
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.
Whereas the Evans majority considered
Washington's reliance on Justice Harlan's neutral
principle formulation as evidence that the Hunter
doctrine protected against more than racial
discrimination, Justice Erickson found no such
evidence. Instead, he found grounds to confirm his
own conclusion that the Hunter doctrine should be
construed narrowly, applicable only to legislation
that is racially discriminatory.
Accordingly, Justice Erickson found that
Amendment 2 could not possibly have infringed
upon the plaintiffs' fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process, because "the
Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that a
fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process exists that is subject to the strict
scrutiny standard of review." Thus, Justice Erickson
disagreed with the majority that Amendment 2
should be subject to strict scrutiny in a full hearing
on the merits, and would have reversed the trial
court's issuance of the preliminary injunction against
Amendment 2.
III. CHOOSING SIDES BETWEEN THE EVANS
MAJORITY AND DISSENT
Under the analyses employed by both the
majority and the dissent, the question of whether
Amendment 2 infringed upon a fundamental
constitutional right for groups to participate equally
in the political process rests upon the breadth of the
Hunter doctrine and whether its neutral principles
formulation protects against non-racial
discrimination. Whereas the majority primarily
looked to Washington and Gordon to bolster its
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conclusion that the Supreme Court has recognized
such a right, Justice Erickson primarily looked to
James and considered it dispositive that the Court
refused to extend Hunter to a case involving
non-racial discrimination.
By framing the contest in this particular
manner, Justice Erickson would appear to have the
upper hand. After all, the Supreme Court has shown
a reluctance to recognize new fundamental
constitutional rights. In addition, the cases upon
which the Evans majority primarily relied did not
consider non-racially discriminatory legislation.
Finally, as Justice Erickson's analysis showed, the
holding in James would seem to be dispositive in
this case; specifically, that the Court has not
recognized a fundamental right for groups to
participate equally in the political process.
However, the Evans v. Romer inquiry is not yet
complete, for the majority failed to introduce one
additional class of cases bearing on its search for a
fundamental right of groups to participate equally in
the political process, and the dissent failed to
adequately explore the Supreme Court's rationale in
James.
The additional class of cases not covered by the
Evans majority includes two relatively recent
Supreme Court decisions that considered the
justiciability of political gerrymandering; namely,
Karcher v. Daggett and Davis v. Bandemer.
For years, the Supreme Court had been reluctant
to subject legislative apportionment plans to careful
scrutiny, even where the districts varied significantly
in population. In Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v.
Sims, the Court retreated somewhat from its
position of extreme judicial restraint and enunciated
the "one person, one vote" principal. Under that
standard, all electoral districts within a state were
required to contain substantially the same number of
individuals. Therefore, so long as legislative
districts were drawn equipopulously, the Court
would not likely strike them down--even if they were
intentionally desined to dilute or cancel out the
voting strength of a particular political group. Over
time, a number of the Justices grew frustrated with
this narrow approach.
In Karcher v. Daggett, the Court considered the
validity of a New Jersey congressional
reapportionment plan that included de minimis
numerical population differences between the
districts. Although the differences were
mathematically insignificant, the majority struck the
plan, largely basing its holding on the Reynolds one
person, one vote rule. While the actual holding of
the Karcher majority bears little relevance to the
Evans case, the underlying theme found in the
concurring and dissenting opinions does. In each,
the Justices asserted that a rigid and myopic
application of the one person, one vote rule may
contravene the Reynolds requirement of "full and
effective participation by all citizens" in the
political process.
In his provocative concurrence, Justice Stevens
complained of the inadequacy of the Reynolds rule:
"The major shortcoming of the numerical standard
is its failure to take account of other relevant
data--indeed, more important- criteria relating to
the fairness of group participation in the political
process." He thereby articulated a rule against
political gerrymandering:
When a State adopts rules governing its
election machinery. . , those rules must serve
the interests of the entire community. If they
serve no purpose other than to favor one
segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious,
economic, or political--. . . or to disadvantage a
politically weak segment of the community,
they violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection.
Together with Justice Powell, who approvingly
cited these remarks in his own dissent, Justice
Stevens interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
prohibit the states from purposefully excluding any
political group (whether it be racial or otherwise)
from the political process by the gerrymander. The
two Justices thereby concluded that political
gerrymandering is justiciable, and they specified that
apportionment plans having "the purpose and effect
of substantially disenfranchising identifiable groups
of voters" are unconstitutional.
Similarly, in their dissenting opinion, Justices
White, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
expressed their own concern that the Reynolds rule
is incapable of restraining "a far greater potential
threat to equality of representation, the
gerrymander." They stated:
"Legislatures intent on minimizing the
representation of selected political or racial
groups are invited to ignore political boundaries
and compact districts so long as they adhere to
population equality. . . " Here, the dissenters
asserted a concern that groups be accorded
equal representation within the political
process. Along with Justices Stevens and
Powell, they forcefully rejected gerrymandering
practices aimed to dilute the voting strength of
identifiable political groups, regardless of
whether the groups be racial or otherwise. Such
a rejection corresponds well with the Evans
majority's reading of Hunter, specifically, that
states may not rig their political processes in
order to disadvantage any particular group from
obtaining legislation in its own behalf.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court went
a step further than the five Justices in Karcher. At
issue in that case was an Indiana redistricting plan
designed to "save as many incumbent Republicans as
possible." With Justice White writing for a plurality,
the Court ruled for the first time that equal
protection challenges to political gerrymandering are
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not barred by the political question doctrine. In
essence, the Court recognized that each political
group in a state should have the same chance to elect
the representatives of its choice as any other political
group. Accordingly, the Court declined to hold that
"[political gerrymandering] claims are never
justiciable."
Significantly, the Court did not limit this ruling
to the context of racial discrimination. Instead, the
Court espoused the-following approach to detect
impermissible gerrymandering: "[U]nconstitutional
discrimination occurs only when the electoral system
is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on
the political process as a whole." The Court's
inquiry would consider, inter alia, the affected group
members' resulting chance to directly influence the
election returns and to attract the attention of the
winning candidate. In this way, "a finding of
unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of
... [an] effective denial to a minority of voters of a
fair chance to influence the political process."
Thus, under Davis, the Court recognized a
"generalized group right to equal representation"
under the Equal Protection Clause. By holding
political gerrymandering claims justiciable, the
Davis plurality endorsed the constitutional right for
political groups to enjoy an equal opportunity to
influence the political process. Here, any political
group, whether it be racial or otherwise, may not be
denied a fair chance to participate along with the
other various political groups. While it is not certain
that a majority of the justices on the current
Supreme Court would support the Davis ruling on
the justiciability of political gerrymandering, the
case goes far to demonstrate that the Evans
majority's interpretation of the Hunter doctrine is
convincing, for if States are prohibited from
marginalizing political groups from the political
process by the gerrymander, it arguably follows that
they are not permitted to marginalize any particular
group by legislation which effectively denies that
group the ability to obtain laws favorable to it.
As for Justice Erickson's failure to adequately
explore the Court's rationale in James v. Valtierra,
that case stands more for the questionable
proposition that legislation enacted by direct
democracy deserves increased judicial deference
than it does for the Court's unwillingness to apply
Hunter to invalidate non-racially discriminatory
legislation.
Justice Black, the dissenter in Hunter, wrote the
majority opinion for the James Court. A literal
reading of Hunter and other Court precedent would
have made James seem "an open and shut case."
After all, the only major difference between the
legislation in James and the charter amendment in
Hunter was that one discriminated on the basis of
wealth, the other on the basis of race. Moreover,
earlier Supreme Court decisions concerning the
right to fair treatment in the criminal process,
voting rights and the ability to engage in interstate
travel indicated that the Court intended to scrutinize
classifications based on wealth under the same
increased standard of review as racial classifications.
Nevertheless, "[a]s if writing on a clean slate rather
than a complicated body of seemingly contrary
precedent," Justice Black summarily concluded that
Article XXXIV did not discriminate against the
poor; but even if it did discriminate against the
poor, it did not discriminate on the basis of race. He
thereby refused to strike Article XXXIV, stating that
the legislation could be invalidated "only by
extending Hunter [to wealth classification] and this
we decline to do." In response to Justice Black's
apparent disregard of applicable Court precedent
and the de jure wealth classification in Article
XXXIV, one commentator has written that the
approach taken in James "cries out for an
explanation."
One primary explanation for the Court's
anomalous decision in James is Justice Black's
notable, and arguably misplaced, enthusiasm for
direct democracy and the voter-initiative process. In
terms reflective of his dissent in Hunter, Justice
Black wrote: "[Pirovisions for referendums
demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias,
discrimination, or prejudice." Noting that the
California statute books contain much legislation
first enacted by voter initiative, he continued: "This
[voter initiative] procedure ensures that all the
people of a community will have a voice in a
decision. . . . It gives them a voice in decisions that
will affect the future development of their own
community." Justice Black thereby upheld Article
XXXIV, largely due to his strong support for the
voter initiative process as a structure for local
government law. As one critic put it: "[James] can
be explained only by a deep-seated faith in the
sanctity of referenda results. .... "
While a discussion of the wisdom of Justice
Black's "faith" is beyond the scope of this Note, it is
important to mention that some commentators have
expressed deep skepticism concerning the value of
voter initiatives, especially where a proposition
refers to a group of individuals in pejorative or
stigmatizing terms, or requires voters to take sides
for and against a particular social group. And as the
Evans majority noted in its review of Amendment 2,
the Supreme Court itself has declared: "One's right
to life liberty, and property . . . and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections."
Further, "[a] citizen's constitutional rights can
hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the
people choose that it be."
Therefore, contrary to Justice Erickson's
assertion in Evans, James is not dispositive of
Amendment 2, for it does not necessarily
demonstrate that Hunter is limited only to the racial
discrimination context. Instead, James stands more
for the questionable proposition that legislation
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enacted by direct democracy deserves increased Clause; and more generally, as a process defect in
judicial deference. the republican form of government prescribed by the
IV. CONCLUSION contours of the Constitution.
Presently, at least eight states have initiatives
pending that would outlaw enactment of laws
protecting gay men, lesbians and bisexuals. Like
Amendment 2, these initiatives aim to prevent an
identifiable class of persons from seeking legislation
and other governmental action favorable to it.
Pursuant to the Hunter doctrine, augmented by the
Supreme Court's rationale in Washington, Gordon,
Karcher and Davis, the constitutional validity of
these initiatives is highly suspect, for the Court
disfavors legislation that seeks to "fence out"
identifiable groups from the political process.
More specifically, these cases establish that the
Supreme Court has recognized that identifiable
groups have a fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process under the Equal
Protection Clause. As the Evans majority correctly
held, initiatives like Colorado Amendment 2 trigger
the highest level of scrutiny from the courts because
they infringe upon this particular constitutional
right. As a result, courts are likely to strike them
down even before they can be enforced. Such bleak
prospects should serve to stifle legislative efforts
similar to those that successfully placed Amendment
2 before the voters of Colorado.
Over two hundred years ago the framers of the
Constitution recognized the dangers inherent in a
democracy in which the will of an unfettered
majority could overrun the interests of a particular
minority. As a result, various institutional
mechanisms were designed to simultaneously enact
rule in accord with the consent of the majority and
provide effective protection for minority interests.
The political process was thus styled upon a strategy
of "pluralism"; "one of structuring the government,
and to a limited extent society generally, so that a
variety of voices [are] guaranteed their say and no
majority coalition [can] dominate." To the extent
that all interests are represented in the nrocess, the
resulting value determinations are deserving of trust;
that is, they may be considered "legitimate."
Initiatives like Colorado Amendment 2,
however, serve to undermine the political process
contemplated by the Framers. By expressly "fencing
out" members of an identifiable group so as to deny
then an "effective voice in the governmental affairs
which substantially affect their lives," such
initiatives restructure the process in a way that is
"undoubtably . .. contrary to the notion that '[t]he
concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution
visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality
among those who meet the basic qualifications."' As
a result, legislation that prohibits an identifiable
class of persons from participating equally in the
political process is constitutionally suspect:
specifically, as an infringement upon a fundamental
constitutional right under the Equal Protection
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HIGH COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER STATES MAY BAN LAWS PROTECTING
HOMOSEXUALS
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Wednesday, February 22, 1995
Paul M. Barrett
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
Washington - The Supreme Court, stepping into the
fray over gay rights, agreed to decide whether states
may ban government policies or laws that
specifically protect homosexuals.
The justices said yesterday they would hear
Colorado's appeal defending a popularly enacted
state constitutional amendment that blocked cities
and the state from giving civil-rights protection to
homosexuals. Colorado's top court last year upheld
a trial judge's order throwing out the antigay
amendment as a violation of the federal
Constitution.
The case gives the Supreme Court its first
opportunity to rule on the merits of antigay ballot
initiatives, which have become a conservative
rallying point in many places across the country.
Colorado is the only state to pass such a measure on
a statewide basis, but there were unsuccessful
campaigns for similar provisions in 10 other states
last year, according to the Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund.
A decision in the Colorado case, which will be
argued in the fall, probably won't come until 1996,
practically guaranteeing that it will become an issue
in the presidential election campaign. A legal
challenge to the Clinton administration's modified
military ban on homosexuals is proceeding on a
separate track. Although both cases involve gay
rights, there are significant factual and legal
differences, and the Colorado case won't necessarily
determine the outcome in the military case.
Passed by voters in 1992, Colorado's so-called
Amendment 2 would have eliminated existing state
policies and local ordinances in Aspen, Denver and
Boulder that prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation. A group of individuals and those
three cities sued the state, claiming the amendment
violated the constitutional rights of homosexuals.
The challengers persuaded a state trial judge to
bar the state from implementing Amendment 2, and
the state Supreme Court upheld that ruling. The
state Supreme Court based its decision on what it
saw as a violation of the "fundamental right" of "an
independently identifiable group" - gay and
bisexual citizens -- "to participate equally in the
political process." The participation the state court
had in mind was seeking approval of ordinances and
government policies banning antigay bias. The state
court said this right has its roots in the "equal
protection" guarantee in the U.S. Constitution.
In its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Colorado asserted that the state's high court had
improperly invented a new constitutional right. The
state defended Amendment 2's proponents as trying
to preclude official state "approval of homosexuality
as a legitimate alternative lifestyle." The
amendment, the state asserted, "was intended to
prevent homosexuals and bisexuals from receiving
preferred legal status," not to eliminate all legal
rights for these groups, "much less to protect those
who broke the law by threatening or harming
homosexuals and bisexuals."
Colorado warned that if adopted broadly, the
lower court's approach would undermine federal and
state authority to block controversial social policies
adopted locally.
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COURT TO CONSIDER COLORADO'S ATTEMPT TO NEGATE
LOCAL GAY RIGHTS LAWS
The Washington Post
Copyright 1995
Wednesday, February 22, 1995
Joan Biskupic
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court said yesterday it will decide
whether states can override city laws that protect
homosexuals from discrimination, marking the first
time in almost a decade that the justices will address
a major conflict over gay rights.
The Colorado case comes to the court as gay
rights has become a prominent issue in state ballot
initiatives and in politics nationwide.
Since 1986, when the court said states could
outlaw homosexual conduct between consenting
adults, the justices have avoided ruling on the rights
of gay men and lesbians. The consequences of the
new case for homosexual rights will depend on the
breadth of the decision, but it is likely to at least set
rules for states trying to adopt initiatives opposing
gay rights.
Separately, the court has said it will consider
whether gay and bisexual marchers can be excluded
from the annual St. Patrick's Day parade organized
by Boston veterans. That case focuses on whether
the privately organized parade is a "public
accommodation" that must allow a range of
marchers.
"This is a critical moment for gay men and
lesbians," said gay rights lawyer William
Rubenstein, surveying cases nationwide.
Rex E. Lee, a former U.S. solicitor general
representing the state of Colorado, said yesterday
that the new case will be important for state
authority. The Colorado Supreme Court had struck
down the state's voter-approved constitutional
amendment, saying it prevented homosexuals from
participating equally in politics.
'There are few issues as divisive as the standing
of homosexuals and bisexuals in American society,"
Lee and Colorado Attorney General Gale A. Norton
had said in the state's appeal, adding that states
should be able to preempt city policies giving
homosexuals special legal status.
Colorado's "Amendment 2," prohibiting
municipalities from passing special legal protections
for homosexuals, was adopted in 1992 after Denver,
Boulder and Aspen enacted ordinances against
discrimination based on sexual orientation in jobs,
housing and public accommodations. Because of the
legal challenge by the cities and a group of gay
individuals, it has never been enforced.
The key question in the case to be argued next
fall is whether a state's prohibition on local
protections for homosexuals violates a fundamental
right. That question is in itself important, but the
more basic test for homosexual status -- whether
homosexuality can be equated with race or sex for
constitutional protection against discrimination --
may not be reached in this case. The Colorado
Supreme Court avoided that question when it ruled
that the amendment violated the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The state court said Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional "because it bars gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals from having an effective voice in
governmental affairs, insofar as those persons deem
it beneficial to seek legislation that would protect
them from discrimination based on their sexual
orientation."
The state court focused on the "fundamental
right . . . [of an identifiable group] to participate
equally in the political process" by getting cities to
pass specific anti-discrimination laws. It said the
amendment wrongly singled out one form of
discrimination, based on sexual orientation, and
removed it from consideration by the political
process.
The court said a state can infringe a
"fundamental right" of an "identifiable group" only
if the state has a compelling interest. It then spurned
all of the state's asserted interests, including that the
amendment preserved the integrity of the state's
"political functions" and deterred "factionalism" and
that it prevented the government from interfering
with personal, familial and religious privacy.
The Colorado court relied on a line of cases
dating to 1969 that preserve groups' rights to
participate in the political process.
Lee, who is president of Brigham Young
University, said that precedent, involving the ability
to ask local governments for protection against
discrimination, was misapplied because it relates
only to racial minorities. He and Colorado officials
insist that Amendment 2 also does not infringe on
the ability of homosexuals to vote or otherwise be
part of politics.
Colorado said the state ruling implicitly
elevated sexual orientation to the level of protection
accorded race or sex against government
discrimination.
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Jean Dubofsky, counsel for gay men and
lesbians challenging Amendment 2, countered that
the state court properly relied on high court
language saying that states may not "disadvantage
any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation on its behalf."
Overall, she said yesterday, the case of Romer v.
Evans presents the justices with an opportunity to
rule broadly on gay rights. But she said that the
court would be reluctant to say whether sexual
orientation should be a "suspect classification,"
deserving constitutional protection comparable to
that for racial minorities.
"I'm not sure we would win on that," she added,
given the court's generally conservative composition
and the paucity of lower court rulings it uses for
guidance.
"Perhaps most important . . . could be the
political ramifications," said Rubenstein, a former
director of the American Civil Liberties Union's
lesbian and gay rights project who now teaches
courses on sexual orientation and the law at Harvard
and Yale universities. He said that while numerous
states and cities have proposed initiatives similar to
Colorado's, other states are moving on the opposite
track by amending anti-bias laws to include
protections against discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The District of Columbia and eight
states offer some anti-bias protection for
homosexuals.
The states of Virginia, Nebraska, Alabama and
Idaho had urged the court to take the Colorado
conflict. In a "friend of the court" brief filed by
former federal judge Robert H. Bork, the states said
the Colorado court wrongly created a new
fundamental right "of breathtaking scope."
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GOVERNMENT TO STAY OUT OF LEGAL BATTLE OVER GAY RIGHTS
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Friday, June 9, 1995
David G. Savage
The Clinton Administration announced
Thursday that it will stay out of a Supreme Court
battle over whether states and cities can strip
lesbians and gays of legal protection against
discrimination, a move that gay rights activists
immediately derided as cowardly.
U.S. Atty. Gen. Janet Reno said that the Justice
Department will not file a friend-of-the-court brief
and will take no legal position in the case, which
challenges Colorado's anti-gay rights initiative.
"There was no federal program or federal statute
involved and so we determined that at this point the
federal government should not participate," Reno
said.
White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry
said that President Clinton is "fully supportive" of
Reno's decision.
For months, Administration lawyers have been
divided over whether they should enter the case and
support the challenge to the Colorado initiative. The
issue apparently was complicated by the
Administration's obligation to defend its own
anti-gay rights policy for military personnel.
Clearly the issue has strong political overtones.
Clinton and his advisers have acknowledged that
they were hurt politically two years ago when,
shortly after taking office, Clinton tried to end the
military's strict exclusion of gays.
Gay rights lawyers and activists accused the
Administration on Thursday of abandoning its
commitment to civil rights and caving in to political
pressure.
"It is disappointing that the Clinton
Administration refuses to stand up for basic civil
rights for all people," said Suzanne Goldberg, an
attorney for the Lambda Legal Defense Fund in New
York. "There's no question this was a political
decision."
Daniel Zingale, political director for the Human
Rights Campaign Fund in Washington, said that the
decision "just gives aid and comfort to the anti-gay
extremists. This will impress the folks who don't
support the President anyway."
Administration officials insisted that their
decision was based solely on legal grounds. McCurry
said the President was "aware of the case (but) it was
the attorney general's decision based on her
reasoning, her examination of the law."
A Washington attorney defending the initiative
on behalf of the state of Colorado said that the
Administration was stymied by its need to defend the
Defense Department policy that continues to exclude
gays from the military. That policy recently was
struck down by a federal judge in New York; a case
is expected to reach the Supreme Court eventually.
"I don't think it's humanly possible to argue that
Amendment 2 (in Colorado) is unconstitutional but
their gays-in-the-military policy is constitutional,"
said the attorney, Carter G. Phillips.
The disputed Colorado initiative does not call
for discrimination against gays and lesbians.
However, it prevents gays from bringing claims of
discrimination based on sexual orientation. As a
practical matter, it would invalidate
anti-discrimination ordinances in Denver, Boulder
and Aspen.
Colorado's Amendment 2 proclaims a state
constitutional policy of "No Protected Status Based
on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation"
and states that gays may not bring "any claim of
minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination."
It won the approval of 53% of the state's voters
but was struck down by the state's courts.
The Colorado Supreme Court said that the
amendment denies gays equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution because it
"fences out . .. an identifiable class of persons" from
seeking legal protections. The justices agreed to hear
the state's appeal of that conclusion.
Last month, California Atty. Gen. Dan Lungren,joined by counterparts in six states, filed a brief
supporting Colorado and arguing that judges should
not take away "the right of the people (as a whole) to
set public policies."
The justices will hear arguments in the case
(Romer vs. Evans, 94-1039) in October and issue a
ruling early next year.
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COURT'S DECISION PLEASES SOME MORE THAN OTHERS
Denver Post
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Sunday, February 26, 1995
Al Knight
Denver Post Perspective Editor
When the U.S. Supreme Court announced last
Tuesday that it will review Colorado's Amendment
2 case, both sides claimed they were pleased by the
decision.
Common sense suggests that the joy was not
evenly shared. Attorney General Gale Norton and
her staff had asked for the review and had many
more reasons to rejoice than did attorney Jean
Dubofsky and her clients who had argued against
review.
If the court hadn't agreed to hear the case, it
would have been all over for the attorney general
and for those 800,000-plus voters who had approved
the amendment in 1992, believing it to be a perfectly
valid exercise of the initiative process.
Give Dubofsky and her clients credit, however,
for the speed with which they put on their happy
faces. Some of them even claimed that the court may
be about to issue an order as sweeping as its 1954
Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education decision
desegregating the nation's public schools.
What nonsense. Making such ill-informed
remarks does an enormous disservice to the history
of racial minorities in this country and badly
misrepresents the development of the Amendment 2
case (Evans vs. Romer). The court is not being asked
to legislate some whole new set of principles. It is
being asked to decide if the Colorado Supreme Court
erred in interpreting past U.S. Supreme Court cases
on racial and voting matters and applying them to
homosexuals and bisexuals.
It is simply inconceivable that the court, even if
it wished, would be able to use the Colorado case to
issue some sweeping edict elevating sexual
orientation to the same category of importance as
racial distinctions.
The court, which has been struggling with
endless school-desegregation issues, with
affirmative-action programs gone awry, and with a
variety of other concerns based on race and
ethnicity, is not likely to want to start a whole new
round of social and political turmoil based on sexual
orientation and newly minted claims of group rights.
For the record, Dubofsky's brief arguing against
U.S. Supreme Court review tried to minimize the
importance of the Amendment 2 case. She argued
that "No federal policy is affected by Evans, and the
Colorado Supreme Court decision does not bind
other state or federal courts. At most Evans enjoins
one state law. If the state is correct that this issue
will come up in other states, this court will have
ample opportunity to review the federal question
without prematurely foreclosing lower court
development of the law."
This is a lawyer's way of saying, "There's
nobody here but us chickens." Dubofsky cited a
10-year-old law review article in an effort to avoid
Supreme Court review. The article claimed there is
value to letting legal issues "percolate" in lower
courts before being resolved by the Supreme Court.
Apparently the Supreme Court thought the issues
had percolated enough.
To be sure, the learned law review writers will
be working overtime between now and when the
arguments are heard this fall. The legal academy
will be manufacturing new arguments and novel
legal notions to aid Amendment 2 opponents in the
quite sound belief that the high court may toss out
all or substantial parts of the Colorado Supreme
Court's analysis holding that homosexuals have a
"fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process."
You can be sure that a whole new set of
arguments will be fashioned by fall.
That doesn't mean those who supported
Amendment 2 should be discouraged. There are a
couple of encouraging developments on their side,
these among them:
The U.S. Supreme Court in January agreed to
review a Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling that
required the sponsors of the Boston St. Patrick's Day
Parade to accommodate a gay and lesbian group of
marchers.
The court held essentially that the planned
parade didn't have anything to do with the exercise
of free speech by parade participants. To say the
least, this is a novel notion of what a parade is for.
People for years have paraded to promote something,
to honor someone or to commemorate a group, a
memory or an event. The idea that a parade is not an
exercise of free speech, and that opposite messages
must be welcomed, is therefore a novel one. A lone
dissenting judge argued that gays and lesbians were
barred from the parade not because they are gays
and lesbians, but rather because the sponsors did not
wish to endorse their particular message. The rights
that were threatened, in other words, were the rights
of the parade sponsors.
The Supreme Court review of this case may help
to establish a somewhat better set of rules that will
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protect the free-speech interests of all American
citizens, not just the nosiest and most pushy among
us.
Arguments will be heard next month in the
Sixth Circuit Court on a Cincinnati case very similar
to the one in Colorado. Robert Bork, once a nominee
for the U.S. Supreme Court, will be handling the
case. Because the issues are similar to those in the
Amendment 2 case, the experience before the Sixth
Circuit Court and the way the court responds may be
helpful to the Colorado Attorney General's Office.
Importantly, the cases involving homosexuality
in the military have largely been taken care of
without any significant erosion of military authority.
In the most recent setback for homosexual
litigants, the full Washington D.C. Circuit Court
rejected a claim by a Naval cadet that his "mere"
admission of homosexuality couldn't be used to
discharge him from the service. The court held 7 to
3 that the admission of homosexuality may be
interpreted by military commanders as a
common-sense indicator that the serviceman or
servicewoman is likely to actually engage in
homosexual conduct. This was not the result sought
by gay and lesbian interests, yet the lawyers decided
not to appeal for fear the U.S. Supreme Court might
simply affirm the decision.
It should go without saying that this is a battle
being fought on many fronts. While gay and lesbian
activists continue to talk about the importance of the
court battles they have been very busy indeed in the
regular political arenas trying to win there the
victories that have eluded them in court.
In Denver, for example, there is a proposal
before the Career Service Authority to recognize
domestic partnerships by either heterosexual or
homosexual couples. Under the proposal, a city
workers would be able to take sick leave to care for
sick partners or their children or family members.
There is no fiscal impact, since under city law
the worker either may use the sick leave or be
compensated for it.
There is a looming fiscal impact of several
million dollars per year, however, if the domestic
partnerships became the basis for dispensing health
insurance or pension benefits.
Something like 40 percent of the city's work
force is unmarried.
Efforts to win domestic-partnership benefits
have been under way for 10 years in various
American cities with considerable success. Over 25
of the nation's most liberal cities have recognized
some form of domestic partnership. Some cities
extend this category only to same-sex partners and
some do not. Some limit it to sick leave; many do
not In San Francisco, domestic partners on the city's
payroll will receive pension benefits at a cost of $2.1
million per year. Under Proposition H, approved last
November, the surviving partner receives everything
a surviving spouse would receive.
What has been taking place is a kind of second
political wave. The first was to establish the
applicability of civil rights laws to homosexuals.
Most American cities, including almost all of the
small- and medium-size cities, were untouched by
this activity. Now, however, the most liberal cities
are being visited again with demands for sick leave,
-domestic-partnership registration, pension benefits
or tax reform that would wipe out the distinctions
between the married and unmarried.
The lesson here is simple. Gays and lesbians
shouldn't be able to have it both ways. They have
done quite well winning benefits for themselves in
the normal political arenas, and that is where most
of these disputes should be resolved. The courts,
including especially the U.S. Supreme Court, ought
to take notice and opt to maintain guiding principles
that will leave disputes between competing groups
for public funds and public benefits where ordinary
people can have a say in how they are resolved.
That is what Amendment 2 was and is about.
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Jeffrey A. Roberts
Denver Post Staff Writer
Evans vs. Romer could be as significant to gays
and lesbians as Brown vs. Board of Education was to
blacks.
That's what Richard G. Evans, John Miller and
Priscilla Inkpen suggested yesterday. They are three
of the people who sued the governor, the state and
the state attorney general after Colorado voters
approved Amendment 2 in November 1992.
"This is our Brown," said Evans, the
34-year-old plaintiff whose name is forever attached
to the case because it is listed first on the original
court filing. "Hopefully, it'll go the same way."
In the 1954 landmark civil-rights decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the notion of
separate-but-equal facilities for blacks and whites. In
ruling that racial segregation in public schools
violated the constitutional right of blacks to equal
protection under the law, the justices paved the way
for the civil-rights movement of the 1960s.
Evans, a grants manager in the Denver mayor's
office, hopes the high court comes to a similar
conclusion about Amendment 2 after it reviews the
anti-gay rights initiative later this year.
In the process, he said, gay and lesbian issues
will be "raised to a national level like they've never
been raised before."
"I think we'll win on a 5-4 vote," predicted
Miller, a 57-year-old language professor at the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. "There
are certainly conservative members of the court who
will not vote in favor of it. But I also see a middle
ground deveinning amonp the civil lihertarians, and
that middle ground will give us a fair hearing."
Miller said he's excited about the Supreme
Court taking the Amendment 2 case, and he plans to
be in Washington, D.C., the day it is argued.
For him, this is the culmination of more than 30
years of civil rights work that began when he was a
college student protesting racial segregation on the
eastern shore of Maryland. In 1988, he sparked a
battle over gay rights by proposing a Colorado
Springs charter amendment that would have banned
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Miller said he was one of the few gay leaders in
the state who expected Amendment 2 to pass, yet he
was devastated when it did. Now he realizes "there
has been some very positive fallout."
"I think there was a strong fusion of diverse
groups in the gay-and-lesbian community as a
result," he said. "The community is stronger.... I
also think the passage of Amendment 2 has led a
number of people to think about the rights of other
individuals."
Inkpen, a 48-year-old ordained minister from
Boulder, said she's worried that a Supreme Court
review of Amendment 2 will put the plaintiffs' lives
on the line, possibly jeopardizing their jobs and
safety. But she also believes that, sooner or later, the
court was going to hear a gay-rights case.
CHRONOLOGY
*MARCH 1991 - Responding to proposed
gay-rights laws, a group of Colorado Springs
business leaders and Christian activists forms
Colorado for Family Values. Co-founders Tony
Marco and Kevin Tebedo begin circulating drafts of
a proposed constitutional amendment that would ban
passage or enforcement of gay-rights laws in
Colorado.
*JULY 31, 1991 - CFV files the proposed ballot
initiative and begins gathering signatures.
*MARCH 20, 1992 - CFV delivers 85,000
petition signatures to Secretary of State Natalie
Meyer in an armored truck. Though thousands of
signatures are thrown out as invalid, Meyer later
rules enough were gathered to get the measure on
the ballot.
*NOV. 3, 1992 - Amendment 2 passes with
53.4 percent of the vote.
*NOV. 12, 1992 - A coalition of gay-rights
activists and lawyers files suit in Denver District
Cout, asking a judge to throw out Amendment 2 as
unconstitutional.
*JAN. 14, 1993 - On the day before
Amendment 2 is scheduled to take effect, Denver
District Judge Jeff Bayless issues a one-day
restraining order suspending it.
*JAN. 15, 1993 - Bayless issues an injunction
prohibiting Amendment 2 from becoming law until
he can hear full arguments in October.
*JULY 19, 1993 -The Colorado Supreme Court
affirms the injunction against Amendment 2.
*OCT. 12, 1993 - Full trial on Amendment 2
begins in Bayless' court, bringing a parade of
national experts on homosexuality and civil rights.
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*DEC. 14, 1993 -Bayless declares Amendment
2 unconstitutional. The state immediately says it will
appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court.
*OCT. 11, 1994 -The Colorado Supreme Court,
in a 6-1 decision, affirms Bayless' ruling that
Amendment 2 is unconstitutional.
*DECEMBER 1994 - The state appeals to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
*YESTERDAY - The U.S. Supreme Court





Wednesday, October 12, 1994
Howard Pankratz
Denver Post Legal Affairs Writer
The Colorado Supreme Court yesterday declared
Amendment 2 unconstitutional, saying it violates a
fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate
equally in the political process.
Gov. Roy Romer and Attorney General Gale
Norton said they will immediately appeal the
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The amendment, which was passed on Nov. 3,
1992, by a vote of 813,966 to 710,151, barred
governments from protecting gays and lesbians from
discrimination and nullified gay-rights ordinances
on the books in Denver, Boulder and Aspen.
The state high court said the state failed to show
either a "compelling state interest" to justify the
amendment or that the measure was written to serve
such interests.
Norton said if the U.S. Supreme Court accepts
the case for review, it could rule on it by next July.
"I believe very strongly that we have an
obligation to the people to pursue this case further,"
said Norton. "The entire basis of the Colorado
Supreme Court decision was flawed in our view. The
Colorado Supreme Court created a brand new
fundamental right that had never been recognized by
any other court."
Said Romer "The people of Colorado deserve a
final decision on this question which is of serious
concern to so many. I have spoken with the attorney
general, and we have agreed that preparation of the
appeal to the nation's highest court will begin
immediately."
Suzanne Goldberg, staff attorney at the Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund and a co-counsel
for opponents of the amendment, called the state
court's decision a "major victory" for lesbian and gay
rights.
But Will Perkins, chairman of Colorado for
Family Values, which sponsored Amendment 2, said
the ruling "is no surprise to the people of Colorado.
Our state's courts have already made known their
willingness to cast aside the freedoms of those who
hold "politically incorrect' beliefs in today's society."
In yesterday's decision, the Colorado high court
said the amendment destroyed the most fundamental
rights of gays and lesbians by "fencing" them out of
the political process that is open to all citizens of the
United States.
"Amendment 2 would forbid governmental
entities from prohibiting discrimination against gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals in all aspects of
commercial and public life," said a majority of six
justices in the 34-page opinion written by Chief
Justice Luis Rovira.
Rovira noted that the amendment clearly affects
the ability of gays to equally participate in the
political process because it denies them an "effective
voice in governmental affairs."
"Amendment 2 alters the political process so
that a targeted class is prohibited from obtaining
legislative, executive and judicial protection or
redress from discrimination absent the consent of a
majority of the electorate," said Rovira.
LONE DISSENT
The lone dissenter, Justice William Erickson,
blasted the majority.
He charged that his fellow justices have "crafted
a new fundamental right that has never been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court" and
only one federal district court judge.
"Ironically, judicial review of Amendment 2 has
accomplished exactly what the voters who passed
Amendment 2 sought to prevent - the majority has
effectively created a heightened protection for
homosexuals, lesbians and bisexuals," said Erickson.
Yesterday's decision upheld a ruling by Denver
District Judge Jeff Bayless that he made last
December after listening to weeks of testimony on
the emotional issue.
In its appeal, the state claimed that the
amendment was an effort by well-meaning citizens
concerned over basic questions of morality.
In briefs filed with the state Supreme Court
earlier this year, deputy attorney generals John
Dailey and Paul Farley said that public morality has
been at the crux of the Amendment 2 litigation since
it began.
They claimed that although Coloradans for the
most part are tolerant of homosexuality, they are
unwilling to support governmental action that could
be viewed as promoting the homosexual lifestyle.
Amendment 2, claimed the state, "insists on the
right to a cultural and educational environment that
conveys, without disrespect but without apology, a
societal preference for heterosexuality."
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The state suggested that if a child hears from his
parents that homosexuality is bad but gets the
Opposite message from the government, parental
authority is undermined.
Yesterday, Rovira and his five colleagues
directly addressed the questions of morality raised by
the state lawyers and its impact on the family.
"This argument fails because it rests on the
assumption that the right of familial privacy
engenders an interest in having government endorse
certain values as moral or immoral," said the
opinion. "While it is true that parents have a
constitutionally protected interest in inculcating
their children with their own values, (the state)
points to no authority ... holding that parents have
the corresponding right of insuring that goverunent
endorse those values."
COURT PRECEDENT
Rovira said that the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the individual's right to profess
or practice certain moral or religious beliefs does not
entail a right to have government itself reinforce or
follow those beliefs or practices.
With or without Amendment 2, parents retain
full authority to express their views about
homosexuality to their children, said Rovira.
Staffwriter Michael Booth contributed to this story.
KEY POINTS
Some of the key observations made by the
Colorado Supreme Court in its Amendment 2 ruling:
*The United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the individual's right to profess
or practice certain moral or religious beliefs does not
entail a right to have government itself reinforce or
follow those beliefs or practices.
*Furthermore, even recognizing the legitimacy
of promoting public morals as a government interest,
it is clear to us that Amendment 2 is not necessary to
preserve heterosexual families, marriage, or to
express disapproval of gay men, lesbians and
bisexuals.
*The right to participate equally in the political
process is clearly affected by Amendment 2, because
it bars gay men, lesbians and bisexuals from having
an effective voice in governmental affairs....
*Amendment 2 alters the political process so
that a targeted class is prohibited from obtaining
legislative, executive, and judicial protection or
redress from discrimination absent the consent of the
majority of the electorate through the adoption of a
constitutional amendment.
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ANGRY GAYS VOW TO KEEP FIGHTING




Thursday November 5, 1992
Gary Massaro
- Rocky Mountain News staff writer
A coalition of gay and other community
leaders angered by the passage of Amendment 2 on
Wednesday threatened national boycotts of Colorado
and vowed to challenge the measure in court.
Gov. Roy Romer said he believes the
amendment is unconstitutional. A gay physicians'
group canceled its convention in Denver. Someone
painted the word "queer" on Folsom Field at the
University of Colorado in Boulder, and two
Colorado lawmakers promised to back a federal
gay and lesbian civil rights act.
Late Wednesday, the Colorado AIDS
Education Foundation board voted to end all
contracts with Colorado companies that provide
medical supplies and printing. Executive director
Rick Sanchez said the agency serves a nine-state
region and annually spends more than $8 million to
provide AIDS education and hospice care.
Colorado voters passed Amendment 2 by
100,000 votes Tuesday. The initiative prohibits a
protected status for homosexuals at all levels of
government in the state.
It also repeals anti-bias ordinances in Denver,
Boulder and Aspen.
Will Perkins, chairman of Colorado for
Family Values, had predicted before the vote that
the initiative "will open a can of worms" because of
numerous lawsuits.
On Wednesday, Mary Celeste, an attorney
for the Colorado Legal Initiatives Project, said she
is inviting Denver, Boulder, Aspen and other
communities and groups to join her in the
challenge she plans to file in Denver District Court.
Romer and Denver Mayor Wellington Webb
met with Amendment 2 opponents in hopes of
defusing an angry response to the vote and to
discuss ways to fight the amendment.
"My personal opinion is it's unconstitutional to
discriminate based on sexual orientation," Romer
told about 800 angry people crowded into the First
Baptist Church, 1331 Grant St.
A sign in the pews said, "Fire Me. It's Legal."
Said another, "Shame on You, Colorado."
Supporters raised more than $3,600 to start
financing the legal battle.
Webb told the group he thinks the law is invalid
in Denver because it is a home-rule city. But
because of promised legal action, it's unclear what
the passage of Amendment 2 will do to the portion
of Denver's civil rights ordinance that prohibits
discrimination based on sexual orientation in
employment, housing, public accommodations and
health and welfare services, City Attorney George
Cerrone said.
Rep. Pat Schroeder, D-Colo., shared a letter
with the group at First Baptist that she sent to
President-elect Clinton, noting that "Colorado
became the first state in the nation to deny its
lesbian and gay citizens equal rights."
Schroeder told Clinton, "The only way we
can stem the tide of discrimination within our
state or nationwide is through passage of a federal
gay and lesbian civil rights bill, which has
languished in Congress for 18 years."
Rep. David Skaggs, D-Colo., told the crowd he
will work to get a federal civil rights law passed to
protect gays.
The vows to continue the battle don't
surprise Perkins, chairman of Colorado for Family
Values, the Colorado Springs-based group that
initiated the amendment.
"Equal Protection Campaign Colorado has
said from the outset that it will test the
consitutionality of our amendment," Perkins said.
"It was drawn up by constitutional lawyers. It was
scrutinized by the attorney general's office. EPOC
protested it three times. And the attorney general
never changed a word.
"You must realize that the governor, in an
effort to try to save face, has to go through this
process. After all, he was the honorary chairman of
EPOC. We are confident that it is constitutional.
And the reason it is constitutional is it's not
discriminatory to homosexuals."
Students at Colorado State University in Fort
Collins joined in a "No on 2" rally.
In Denver, politicians and activists urged
people to remain calm and fight legally.
One group already has vowed to boycott
Colorado businesses. Another has canceled a
convention in Denver next year.
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In Boulder, someone poured bleach on and
spray-painted the artificial turf at Folsom Field
apparently in connection with the vote.
John Krueger, facilities and grounds manager,
said workers could discern the word "queer"
painted in letters about four feet tall on the south
10-yard line.
"I couldn't make out the second word," Krueger
said.
An anonymous caller told the Rocky
Mountain News the second word was "pride."
Romer reminded the church crowd that he is
obligated to administer the laws.
"I opposed it, the people passed it," he said.
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COLORADANS ON THE GAY AMENDMENT
The Wall Street Journal
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Tuesday, December 15, 1992
Vincent Carroll
Denver - Now that the Reagan-Bush era has
expired, where will the nation's moral philosophers
find a target for disdain? In Colorado, it seems,
whose citizens banned gay-rights ordinances last
month in a statewide vote.
Whoopi Goldberg, Joan Rivers and director
Jonathan Demme have endorsed a ban of vacations,
meetings and movie productions in Colorado. Barbra
Streisand charged to a microphone to denounce
Colorado's "vote for hate." Martina Navratilova has
vowed to abandon her lush Aspen compound if
Coloradans do not reverse their stand. Meanwhile,
groups such as the American Association of Law
Libraries and the National Council for Social
Studies have canceled conventions in Denver. New
York City, Atlanta and Philadelphia have barred all
municipal travel to Colorado.
There is at least some question, however,
whether the majority of boycotters really understands
what happened in this state. Both before and after
the election, the debate over Amendment 2 centered
on an unexpected topic: not on the morality of gay
behavior, although that discussion of course
occurred, but on the very nature of civil rights
enforcement. It is safe to say that public resentment
over affirmative action policies was indispensable to
the amendment's success.
Most Coloradans are a live-and-let-live breed,
ill-cast as exemplars of intolerance. Most believe in
frugal government, and hence are often described as
conservative. But on social issues, they seem to take
their cues less from the "religious right" than from
a vague libertarianism.
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pundit and pollster that Amendment 2, which bars
any legal claims of discrimination by homosexuals
and overturns three gay-rights ordinances, in Aspen,
Boulder and Denver, passed so handily last month,
by 53.4% to 46.6%. The experts simply failed to
appreciate- the simmering resentment concerning
preferential treatment of previously protected
groups, and the public's resolve not to enlarge the
list.
Evidence of this resentment is liberally scattered
throughout hundreds of letters on Amendment 2 that
have piled up in the Rocky Mountain News editorial
offices - more such letters, pro and con, than on any
issue in memory.
To test the theory that Amendment 2 owed its
success to a potent coalition of moralists opposed to
homosexuality and egalitarians fearing special
treatment for yet another minority, I classified the
arguments of 100 of the most recent letters in favor
of the amendment. The results were revealing, if
admittedly something less than social science: About
one-third of the letter writers offered moral reasons
for supporting Amendment 2; about one-fourth cited
idiosyncratic reasons that fit no category or simply
weren't fully coherent; and the rest staked their case
on an opposition to "special rights" for any group of
Americans.
Within the last category, the following excerpts
are typical. Beth Chilcote of Colorado Springs said
she "voted yes on Amendment 2 not because I
dislike homosexuals but because I disagree with
special interests." Dana Yocom of Mancos argued
that homosexuals "already have equal rights. They
want preferential rights. . . " A Mrs. Aragon of
Thornton wrote that "I was not promoting an open
season of discrimination against homosexuals. Mine
was not a hate vote. . . . Giving one special interest
group special rights will only lead to another special
interest group wanting another special rights
amendment."
One amendment supporter noted that he also
had voted for Bill Clinton and against school
vouchers, but added that "no one group should be
granted any special privileges." A few were
obviously familiar with the legalese of affirmative
action: "The sole purpose of Amendment 2," wrote
Matthew Schaefer of Littleton, "is to prevent the
labeling of homosexuals and bisexuals a protected
class as defined in civil rights legislation."
Brian Pike of Arvada acknowledged a personal
motive: "Caucasian males cannot vote in favor of
any additional groups being given protective status
concerning employment opportunities, be it new jobs
or promotions." Wes Nelson of Aurora seconded the
notion: "When I cast a yes vote for Amendment 2, it
had nothing . . . to do with family values, since
anyone with a two-digit IQ or better should realize
by now that you cannot legislate morals. My vote
had everything to do with an attempt to restore equal
rights."
A few letter writers feared the effects of
gay-rights laws on business. "What of the rights of
employers," asked Lynda Lackey of Aurora, "when
legitimate layoffs and firings are perverted into
discrimination issues?" And so it went, with J.S.
Gonzales of Golden pretty much summing up the
prevailing sentiment among the egalitarians: "I am
a supporter of Amendment 2, not because I hate
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homosexuals but because I believe in equal rights..
Now, obviously, a lot of people did vote for
Amendment 2 because of revulsion for
homosexuality or the gay lifestyle as they conceive
it. In Oregon, it is worth noting, a ballot proposal
that went much further than Colorado's, actually
describing homosexuality as abnormal and perverse,
attracted 43% of the vote. For that matter, many
people are notably coy about owning up to their real
attitudes toward questions involving gay rights, as
Colorado pollsters discovered to their
embarrassment.
Still, in retrospect, it is clear that Amendment
2 became, in effect, a dual referendum, a judgment
on homosexuality to some and on affirmative action
to others. Opponents of Amendment 2 assured voters
over and over that gay people only sought protection
from discrimination in housing, employment and
accommodations, not special rights. Thousands of
Coloradans simply didn't believe it.
In assessing blame for their defeat, gay-rights
activists and their allies understandably point toward
the Christian right. But with nearly equal accuracy,
they might direct some of the blame toward the
nation's civil rights establishment, which for the past
quarter century has perverted laws guaranteeing
equal opportunity into policies that mock individual
rights and confer benefits on the basis of
membership in a protected group.
They fooled us once, many Colorado voters
seemed to say, but we won't be fooled again.
- Mr. Carroll is editor of the editorial pages at
the Rocky Mountain News.
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